Booth v. State Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 37296 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-4-2010
Booth v. State Clerk's Record Dckt. 37296
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation




OF THE 37296 
STATE OF IDAHO 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-
Appellant. 
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho, in and for Canyon County 
Honorable GREGORY M. CULET, District Judge 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Atty. Gen. 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Van G. Bishop 
203 12th Ave. Rd., Ste. B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Attorney for Respondent 
'} ., 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent -
Appellant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 












Supreme Court No. 37296 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET, Presiding 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, 
P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Van G. Bishop, 203 lih Ave. Rd., Ste. B, Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Register of Actions 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, filed 8-11-06 
Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, filed 8-23-06 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 11-15-07 
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed 12-17-07 
Answer to First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
Filed 12-21-07 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 1-14-08 
Court Scheduling Order, filed 1-23-08 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed 3-3-08 
Notice of Filing "Exhibit A" of Post Conviction Petition, filed 7-10-08 
Court Minutes-Motion Hearing, held 7-14-08 
Notice ofIntent to Dismiss Pursuant to Idaho Code, filed 7-22-08 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, Denying Motion for 
Summary Judgment, etc., filed 7-29-08 
Verification of the First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, filed 8-18-08 
Affidavit of Trevor Booth in Support of Post Conviction Relief, 
filed 8-18-08 
Answer and/or Response to Verification of Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, filed 9-9-08 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 10-2-08 





12 - 13 




28 - 30 
31 - 35 
36 - 38 
39-40 
41 -43 
44 - 51 
52 - 54 
55 - 66 
67 -68 
69-70 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Court Minutes-Evidentiary Hearin " held 4-13-09 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 8-26-09 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order Granting Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, filed 12-1-09 
Motion to Reconsider, filed 12-9-09 
Notice of Appeal, filed 1-11-10 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 1-13-10 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 1-19-10 
Certificate of Exhibits 
Certificate of Clerk 
Certificate of Service 
Page No. 
71 -78 
79 - 80 
81 - 109 
110-117 
118 - 121 
122 - 125 





Affidavit of Trevor Booth in Support of Post Conviction Relief, 
filed 8-18-08 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 1-13-10 
Answer and/or Response to Verification of Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, filed 9-9-08 
Answer to First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
Filed 12-21-07 
Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, filed 8-23-06 
Certificate of Clerk 
Certificate of Exhibits 
Certificate of Service 
Court Minutes-Evidentiary Hearing, held 4-13-09 
Court Minutes-Motion Hearing, held 7-14-08 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 10-2-08 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 11-15-07 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 1-14-08 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 1-19-10 
Court Minutes-Status Conference, held 8-26-09 
Court Scheduling Order, filed 1-23-08 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order Granting Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, filed 12-1-09 
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed 12-17-07 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed 3-3-08 
Page No. 
52- 54 
122 - 125 
55 -66 
20-22 









126 - 127 
79- 80 
26-27 
81 - 109 
14 -19 
28 - 30 
INDEX, Continued 
Motion to Reconsider, filed 12-9-09 
Notice of Appeal, filed 1-11-10 
Notice of Filing "Exhibit A" of Post Conviction Petition, filed 7-10-08 
Notice ofIntent to Dismiss Pursuant to Idaho Code, filed 7-22-08 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, Denying Motion for 
Summary Judgment, etc., filed 7-29-08 
Order to Transport, filed 4-10-09 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, filed 8-11-06 
Register of Actions 
Verification of the First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 












Time: 03:03 PM 
Page 1 of3 
Th icial District Court - Canyon Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0008651-C Current Judge: Gregory M Culet 
User: RANDALL 
Trevor James Booth, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 





















Post Conviction Relief 
Judge 
New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief Gregory M Culet 
Filing: 9SPC - Post Conviction Relief Filing Paid by: Booth, Trevor James Gregory M Culet 
(subject) Receipt number: 0198543 Dated: 8/11/2006 Amount: $.00 
(Cash) 
Petition for Post Conviction 
For Information Prior To This Date See Case File. CR2005/1658 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Answer to petition PCR Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 11/15/200708:30 AM) Gregory M Culet 
Notice Of Hearing Gregory M Culet 
hearing held in chambers Gregory M Culet 
State's request for judicial notice Gregory M Culet 
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Gregory M Culet 
Answer to First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 01/14/200801:00 PM) Gregory M Culet 
Notice Of Hearing Gregory M Culet 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 01/14/200801 :00 PM: Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/16/2008 09:00 AM) 1 st setting for Gregory M Culet 
summary disposition 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/06/2008 09:00 AM) 2nd setting Gregory M Culet 
for summary disposition 
Court Scheduling Order Gregory M Culet 
Motion for summary dismissal Gregory M Culet 
Brief in support of motion for summary dismissal Gregory M Culet 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/16/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Gregory M Culet 
Vacated 1 st setting for summary disposition 
Notice vacating hearing/Motion 4-16-08 Gregory M Culet 
Notice Of Hearing Motion Gregory M Culet 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 06/06/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Gregory M Culet 
Vacated 2nd setting for summary disposition 
Stipulation to Continue Hearing (no Order provided) Gregory M Culet 
Notice of filing Exhibit A of PCR Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Scheduled (Further Proceeding 07/14/200801 :30 PM) Gregory M Culet 
Hearing result for Further Proceeding held on 07/14/2008 01 :30 PM: Gregory M Culet 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Debora Kreidler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:less than 100 pages 
Hearing result for Further Proceeding held on 07/14/2008 01 :30 PM: Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 10102/200809:00 AM) 
scheduling 
Notice of intent to dismiss/30 days 
000001 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
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7/29/2008 Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, Denying Motion For Summary Gregory M Culet 















19-4906(b) and ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 10/02/200809:00 AM) 
Verification of the First Amended Petition for PCR 
Affidavit of Trevor Booth in support of PCR 
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Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 10102/200809:00 AM: 
Hearing Held scheduling 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 10102/200809:00 AM: 
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Interim Hearing Held 
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District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Deborah Kreidler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: more than 100 
pages 
Transcript Filed (4-13-09 Hearing) 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/26/2009 11 :00 AM) in 
chambers 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 08/26/2009 11 :00 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 08/26/2009 11 :00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
Respondent's brief 
Proposed findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and~rder 
Closing Argument, Statement of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 11/30/200901 :00 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing/Conference Status 
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Post Conviction Relief 
Judge 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 11/30/200901 :00 PM: Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Held - IN-CHAMBERS 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Petition for Post Gregory M Culet 
Conviction Relief 
Motion to Reconsider Gregory M Culet 
Notice of Appeal (fax) Gregory M Culet 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Amended Notice fo Appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 01/19/201008:30 AM) with 
counsel in chambers 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 01/19/2010 08:30 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: with counsel in 
chambers 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 01/19/201008:30 AM: 
Hearing Held with counsel in chambers 
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Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
VAN G. BISHOP 
LAW OFFICE OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 12th Ave. Road, Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile (208) 465-5881 
ISB #2740 
Attorney for Petitioner 
F I A.~"J~ 
AUG 11 2006 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DELGADO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVORJ~ESBOOTH, ) 









PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
The Petitioner, TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, by and through his attorney, VAN O. BISHOP, of the 
LA W OFFICE OF VAN O. BISHOP, submits this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and alleges: 
1. Place of detention if in custody: Idaho State Correctional Institute, sent to Texas 
presently in transit to new Texas facility. 
2. Name and location of Court which imposed judgment/sentence: District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for the County of Canyon, Caldwell, Idaho, Honorable 
Gregory M. Culet. 
3. The case numbers and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) Case No. CR-2005-1658-C 
(b) Offenses Convicted: First Degree Murder. ORIGINAl. 1 POST CONVICTION RELIEF I TREVOR BOOTH 
000004 
4. The (a) date upon which sentence was imposed and the (b) tenn of the sentence: 
(a) Date of sentence: Hearing held August 11,2005, Judgment filed on August 16,2005. 
(b) Tenns of sentence: Defendant was sentenced to a minimum period of confinement of 
thirty (30) years, and a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed life. 
5. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
(a) Of guilty: X 
(b) Of not guilty: 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? Yes. 
7. State concisely all grounds on which you base your application for post conviction 
relief: 
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(b) Failure to investigate and interview witnesses defendant and defendant's family provided 
showing threats by the victim to defendants family and to the defendant, witnesses as to the 
heavy involvement of the victim in the drug trade, and coercive nature of defendant in dealing 
with the defendant all which could have been used for reduction of the charge and or for 
sentencing purposes. 
(c) Failure to interview members of the law enforcement drug enforcement as to evidence 
beneficial to defendant in reducing the charge to that of manslaughter and for mitigation 
(d) Failure to file a motion and to argue for withdrawal of guilty plea once the sentence was 
imposed. 
(e) Failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence and testimony at sentencing. 
(f) Coercive and threatening tactics used against defendant and defendants family assuring 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF / TREVOR BOOTH 
000005 
2 
them of a 10 year sentence ifhe were to plead and a fixed life sentence ifhe took the case to 
trial. (See attachment "A" Memo) 
8. Prior to this Petition, have you filed with respect to any conviction: No. 
(a) Any petitions in State or Federal Courts for Habeas Corpus? No. 
(b) Any other petitioners, motions or application in this or any other Court? , Yes, Rule 35 
which was summarily denied without hearing. 
9. If your application is based upon failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state 
concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests. Includes, but is 
not limited to: 
(a) Private Counsel, Richard Harris, represented Defendant. Counsel did not contact nor 
interview witnesses which defendant and defendant's family provided to counsel which 
would have shown the coercive and threatening actions of the victim to defendant and the 
direct threat to defendant's family. Counsel coerced defendant and his parents with a 
memo stating that if defendant did not plea to first degree murder and went to trial he 
would get fixed life and by entering a plea that he would only be sentenced to ten (l0) 
years. Counsel wrote a MEMO outlining section 18-4004 Idaho Code (not applicable 
here) to coerce and persuade both defendant and his parents into pleading as charged. 
Counsel did not investigate or evaluate the real possibility of a reduction of the charge to 
one of manslaughter or 2nd degree murder, even after continual requests from the 
defendant and his parents and sister. Counsel had defendant plea without a rule 11 plea 
agreement, nor a viable offer from the prosecution. Defendant's position is he had nothing 
to loose by going to trial on the charges, but it is clear that counsel was not and never 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF / TREVOR BOOTH 
0000'06 
3 
intended to prepare for the case to go to trial. 
10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in fonna pauperis? 
(a) Yes X 
(b) No 
11. State specifically the relief you seek: To have the plea of guilty set aside and the 
matter rescheduled for trial to pursue all legal issues in the criminal matter. 
12. Petitioner respectfully reserves the right to supplement this Post Conviction Petition 
with an affidavit at a later time as well as supplement once the transcripts of the 
hearings have been prepared. Transcripts were requested for the appeal some 10 
months ago and have yet been provided. Defendant has been transferred within the 
Idaho Department of Corrections to a facility in Texas and just recently has been 
moved and is in transit and cannot receive mail and assistance in completing the 
affidavit. Defendant respectfully requests a hearing on his Post Conviction Petition. 
DATED this 11 th day of August 2006. 




Defendant is presently in transit in the correctional facility in Texas and is not available for 
assistance in obtaining his signature and affidavit to verifY this petition. Verification shall be 
submitted once he has been reassigned a facility. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
The undersigned does hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
served by the following method indicated below to each ofthe following: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
x ---
DATED this 11 th day of August 2006. 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF I TREVOR BOOTH 
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DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
AUG 2 3 2.006 
C~~N .C9~N!1_ CLERf< 
I' l D [lfS!ffUTY 
IllS Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
DefendantIPetitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
PlaintifflRespondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV0608651 
) 
) ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 






COMES NOW, The State ofIdaho, by and through its attorney, the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and answer the allegations of Petitioner's Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief as follows: 
1. 
The Respondent admits Paragraph(s) 1,2, 3(a), 3(b), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 6, 8(a) and 
8(b) of the Petition. 
II. 







Responding to the specific allegations of the Petitioner's Petition, the Respondent 
denies each and every allegation not expressly admitted, denied or otherwise responded to herein. 
IV. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Defendant has failed to provide the appropriate affidavits, records and other 
evidence supporting his Petition pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4903, thereby making 
Petitioner's Petition insufficient to sustain the requirement for a proper application for post 
conviction relief and must, therefore, be dismissed. 
V. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in criminal case 
CR0501658 in Canyon County District Court are sufficient to allow the court to make a decision 
upon the Petitioner's Petition and said record and pleadings are sufficient to find that no purpose 
would be served by a post conviction relief proceeding and, therefore, the Petitioner's petition 
should be dismissed. 
VI. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The record and pleadings in the above entitled case and in criminal case 
CR0501658 are the entire record in the matter and that record supports the finding that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a summary judgment and/or dismissal in favor of 
the Respondent is warranted pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 19-4906( c). 
WHEREFORE, The Respondent prays this court to consider the Petitioner's 
Petition, the Respondent's Answer and the pleadings and record in the above entitled case and in 
criminal case CR060 1658 and act as follows: 




without further hearing and pursuant to Idaho Code provisions 19-4901 et seq.; 
2. Grant the Respondent such other relief, legal and equitable, as the court 
may deem proper. d 
DATED Thi~3day of August, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to 
Petition for Post Conviction Reliefwas deli~ tp 1te basket of Van Bishop, Clerk's Office, 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. eUlET DATE: NOVEMBER 15, 2007 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 














CASE NO: CV 2006-8651*C 
TIME: 8:30 AM. 
This having been the time heretofore set for status conference in the above-
entitled matter, the petitioner was not present, but represented by Mr. Van Bishop, and 
the respondent was represented by counsel, Mr. Ken Stringfield. 
The Court indicated that this was the time set for a scheduling conference. 
It was the Courts understanding that the petitioner wished to file and amended 
petition. The Court indicated that was fine, but it would need to be filed by December 
15,2007, and the respondent would be free to file an objection or a response thereto 
within three (3) weeks of the amended petition. 
The Court indicated that the transcripts of the change of plea hearing and the 
sentencing hearing had been requested, but not yet received, therefore the Court would 
CHAMBERS MINUTES 
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 Page 1 
00001.2 
speak with the appeals clerk regarding the transcripts to determine when they would be 
provided. 
The responded would be filing a summary disposition in a timely manner once 
the transcripts had been received. 
The Court further indicated that a second scheduling conference would be set at 
a later date. 
CHAMBERS MINUTES 
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 Page 2 
000013 
Deputy Clerk 
, ' , 
VAN G. BISHOP ISBN 2740 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 - 12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
Attorney for Petitioner 
F I LED 
A.M.me-PM 
DEC 1 7 2007- ., 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J MEYERS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. ) 
--------------------------) 
CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
FIRST AMMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
The Petitioner, TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, by and through his attorney, VAN G. BISHOP, of the LAW 
OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP, submits this Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and alleges: 
1. Place of detention if in custody: Idaho State Correctional Institute, currently housed at Bill 
Clayton Detention Center, Littlefield, Texas .. 
2. Name and location of Court which imposedjudgmentlsentence: Honorable Judge Gregory M. 
Culet, District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Canyon, Caldwell, Idaho. 
3. The case number and the offense for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) CASE NO. CR2005-1658-C 
ORIGINAL 
BOOTH - AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 1 
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\ . 
(b) Offenses Convicted: First Degree Murder 
4. The (a) date upon which sentence was imposed and the (b) term of the 
sentence: 
(a) Date of sentence: Hearing held August 11, 2005, Judgment filed on August 16, 
2005. 
(b) Terms of sentence: Thirty (30) years fixed, and a subsequent indeterminate period 
of confinement not to exceed life. 
5. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
(a) Of guilty: X 
(b) Of not guilty: 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? YES 
7. State concisely all grounds on which you base your application for post conviction 
relief: 
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(b) Failure to investigate and interview potential witnesses in police reports, and which the 
defendant and his family provided which would substantiate the treats the victim made to defendant and 
defendant's family. Additionally witnesses which would have substantiated the victim's activity in the drug 
trade in Canyon County. 
, ( c) Failure to obtain expert advice as to the forensics evidence at the scene of the offense and 
the reenactment of the crime. Failed to assess and analyze the time line for which Defendant was at the 
residence as evidenced by the neighbors leaving and returning and the footsteps in the snow. All of this 
analysis and expert assistance would have substantiated defendants statement to counsel and supported a 
reduced charge of manslaughter or at most 2nd. Degree murder .. 
BOOTH - AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
00001.5 
2 
, (d) Failure to interview members of law enforcement drug enforcement as to evidence 
beneficial to defendant in reducing the charge to that of manslaughter. 
. ( e) Failure to File a Motion and argue for withdrawal of guilty plea once the sentence was 
imposed. 
. (f) Coercive and threatening tactics used against defendant and defendants family assuring 
them a ten (10) year sentence ifhe were to plead and a fixed life sentence ifhe took the case to trial. (Exhibit 
A attached to initial filing) 
(g) Conflict of Interest: Counsel for the defendant had a conflict of interest with the 
defendant in that counsel was the victim's landlord. Counsel owned the real property, rented by the victim 
where the crime occurred and was active in collection of rents, arranging for maintenance as a landlord. 
This conflict was not told to the defendant until the pressure to enter a plea was conducted late in the court 
process. 
8. Prior to this Petition, have you filed with respect to any conviction? 
(a) Any petitions in State or Federal Courts for Habeas Corpus? NO 
(b) Any other petitioners, motions or application in this or any other Court? 
YES - A Rule 35 Motion for reduction of Sentence which was summarily 
denied without hearing. 
9. If your application is based upon failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state 
concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests. Includes, but 
is not limited to: 
(a) Defendant was represented by the Private Counsel, Richard Harris. Counsel approached 
the case as a plea bargain rather than putting forth the necessary time, effort and investigation to prepare the 
BOOTH - AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
00001.6 
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case for trial. The Defendant's grandmother made contact with counsel after the initial arraignment to pay 
money towards the trial and was advised by counsel that this case will not go to trial. Counsel in analyzing 
the case on initial visit and review of the perceived facts, determined that the court would sentence the 
defendant to ten (10) years and at most fifteen (15) years fixed with an Indetenninate Life. Counsel was 
aware of the victim's criminal activities in the drug trade in making this determination. Counsel, however, 
did not investigate, document and obtain the necessmy witnesses to prepare the case for trial should plea 
negotiations breakdown or fail. The state filed a Motion for Special Verdict Form, to which counsel for 
defendant prepared a memo outlining section 18-4004 I.C. (not applicable in this case where death penalty 
was not sought) rather than filing an objection to the requested instruction. Counsel further used the memo 
in coercing the defendant to enter a plea to First Degree Murder advising the defendant that the court would 
only sentence him to ten (10) years but that ifhe were to go to trial there was a possibility that he could serve 
a fixed life sentence. Counsel also advised the defendant's mother, father and sister the same ten year 
sentence would be imposed. The defendant's position up until the coercive action was "I have nothing to 
loose by going to trial". Death penalty was not an option and the evidence to be presented at trial would 
show that the case was one of manslaughter or at most 2nd degree murder. Counsel had not prepared for trial 
and was not in a position to go to trial on the date of the Status Conference when the plea was entered. 
(b) Counsel did not contact nor interview witnesses which the defendant and the defendant's 
-' parents and family provided to counsel who could have shown the coercive and threatening actions made by 
the victim to the defendant and the direct threat to his family. 
(c) Counsel failed to evaluate the evidence and witnesses which if presented would show a 
real possibility of a reduction of the charge to one of manslaughter or 2nd degree murder, even after continual 
requests from the defendant, his parents and sister. An evaluation of the hard evidence, including the 
BOOTH - AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 4 
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neighbors leaving and return, the footprints in the snow would have shown the minimal time that defendant 
was at the house where the offense took place. Additionally, forensics review of the materials for the 
silencer at the sink would show that the victim may have prepared the weapon himself, and a reenactment of 
the firing in the residence would have shown the incident occurred as the defendant had stated to counsel. 
(d) Counsel did not prepare the defendant's family or any other witness for the defendant for 
the sentencing hearing. The defendant's mother was totally caught off guard at being a potential witness at 
the sentencing hearing. She had not been interviewed by counselor advised as to what types of questions he 
would ask, nor was she advised of the cross-examination which she would face. None of the defendant's 
family or friends were contacted as potential witnesses or prepared to be a witness. At sentencing counsel 
did not object to the mother's victim impact statement when she became personal and threatening to the 
defendant and exceeded the permissible content of victim's impact. Counsel did not present mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing hearing. Defendant had many accomplishments as stated in the memorandum in 
support of his Rule 35 Motion which counsel could have presented along with other accomplishments of the 
defendant. 
10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No XX 
11. State specifically the relief you seek: To have the plea of guilty set aside and the matter 
rescheduled for trial to pursue all legal issues in the criminal matter. 
12. Petitioner respectfully reserves the right to supplement this Post Conviction Petition with an 
affidavit at a later time and respectfully requests a hearing on his Post Conviction Petition. 
BOOTH - AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
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DATED this 14th day of December, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
The lUldersigned does hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon COlUlty Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon COlUlty Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
__ D. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
XX Personally delivered 
__ Telecopy/fax 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2007. 




DAVID L. YOUNG, ISB #3679 
F , LED /1}5iJ A.M __ .?M. 
DEC 2 1 zoa7 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M RODRIGUEZ, DEPUTY 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV0608651 
) 
) 
) ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
) PETITION FOR 





COMES NOW, the State ofIdaho, by and through GEARLD L. WOLFF, and does 
hereby answer Petitioner's Trevor James Booth First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 






SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Answering paragraphs 1,2, 3(a), 3(b), 4(a), 4(b), Sea), 6, 8(a), and 8(b) of 
Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the 
allegations contained therein. 
2. Answering paragraphs 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(e), 7(f), (Petitioner has never filed 
Exhibit "A), 7(g), 9(a), 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d), the state denies the conclusory allegations. 
3. Answering paragraph 8(a) and 8(b), that Petitioner has not filed any prior petitions 
for post-conviction relief or petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state or federal court, 
Respondent believes this allegation to be true, but specifically reserves the right to raise a 
successive petition/res judicata/procedural default bar or defense should facts come to light 
indicating that the allegation is in any part false. 
4. Answering paragraph 7 (a-g) and 9 (a-d), assertions of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the state denies the allegations. 
4. Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 regarding in forma pauperis request/request for 
appointment of counsel, are not factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho 
Code § 19-4901(a); LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent the Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims 




THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner has failed to verify his petition as required. Idaho Code §§ 19-4902(a) and 19-
4903. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code §§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
c) for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
DATED thit??J1:; of December, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to 
be delivered to the Defendant's attorney of record b~/acing said copy in the basket of Van 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. eUlET DATE: JANUARY 14,2008 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
) COURT MINUTES 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2006-8651*C 
vs ) 
) TIME: 9:30A.M. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) REPORTED BY: Nancy Christensen 
Defendant. ) Independent 
) 
) DCRT 1 (119-131) 
This having been the time heretofore set for post conviction relief in the above 
entitled matter, the plaintiff did not appear in court, but was represented by counsel, Mr. 
Van Bishop, and the State was represented by counsel, Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
The Court indicated that an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Release had 
been filed and the State had filed a response thereto. 
In answer to the Courts inquiry, each of counsel indicated they had received the 
transcripts prepared in the case. 
COURT MINUTES 
JANUARY 14, 2008 Page 1 
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Mr. Wolff indicated that the State had filed a motion for the Court to take judicial 
notice of the transcripts as well as the clerks records. Further, the State would be filing a 
motion for summary disposition on several issues set forth in the Amended Petition. 
Mr. Bishop advised the Court that he was waiting on an affidavit from his client 
who was being housed in Texas, further; he also had Mr. Richard Harris preparing an 
affidavit which should be filed prior to the motion for summary disposition. 
Mr. Wolff advised the Court that he had not yet received attachment A to the 
original petition. Additionally, he had checked in the Courts file and attachment A had 
not been attached to the Courts petition either. 
Mr. Bishop indicated that attachment A would not be a problem and obtaining Mr. 
Harris' affidavit should not be a problem. Therefore, he would request the Court allow 
him until the 24th day of February to have that information filed. 
Mr. Wolff indicated that he would suggest the Court allow Mr. Bishop until the 1st 
day of March to have that information, as his client was being held in Texas which 
complicated things. 
The Court indicated that Mr. Bishop was to have all the documents filed by 
February 1, 2008 and he could request an extension if needed. 
Mr. Wolff indicated that he would have the motion for summary disposition filed 
within thirty (30) days thereafter. 
COURT MINUTES 




The Court directed the respondent to have the motion for summary disposition 
filed by March 3, 2008, with the petition to file a response thereto by the 1 th day of 
March 2008, and the respondent to file a reply by the 24th day of March 2008. 
The Court would further order this matter set for oral argument on the motion for 
summary disposition for April 16, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. if the Courts death penalty case 
does not interfere, if the jury trial does interfere, oral argument would be heard on June 
6, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. 
The Court directed Mr. Bishop to prepare a scheduling order, submit it to 
apposing counsel for review and then to the Court. 
COURT MINUTES 
JANUARY 14, 2008 Page 3 
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D~ 
VAN G. BISHOP 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 -12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
ISBN 2740 
Attorney for Defendant 
F I LED 
___ A.M. t t10 P.M. 
JAN 232008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J MEYERS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 












CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
COURT SCHEDULING ORDER 
TIllS MA ITER was before the Court on the 14th day of January, 2008 for a status conference. 
The Court discussed the possible conflicting trial scheduled in Payette County which the Court as 
well as Petitioner's counsel is scheduled in for the last of March, April and May. Should the trial in 
Payette County goes then the scheduling order may need to be modified. BASED UPON the 
information provided to the Court, the agreement of the parties, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the scheduling order shall be entered as follows: 
1. Petitioner shall file his affidavits· and a copy of exhibit A on or before February 1, 2008, 
with the Court understanding that the petitioner is being housed in Littlefield, TX under custody of 




the Department of Corrections and obtaining a notarized affidavit could be delayed do to this housing 
assignment. 
2. Respondent shall file his Motion for Summary Judgment on or before March 3, 2008. 
3. Petitioner shall file his response to State's Motion for Summary Judgment on or before 
March 17,2008. 
4. Respondent shall file his reply on or before March 24, 2008. 
5. Oral Argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment shall be heard on April 16, 2008 at 
9am if the Trial in Payette County does not interfere, if the Payette County trial interferes with the 
April date the Oral Argument shall be heard on June 6, 2008 at 9am. 
DATED: January 2~2008 
i 
SCHEDULING ORDER Page 2 of2 
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DAVID L. YOUNG, ISB #3679 
MAR 03 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B RAYNE, DEPUTY 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 










COMES NOW, the State ofIdaho, by and through GEARLD L. WOLFF, and does 
hereby move for summary dismissal of Petitioner's Trevor Booth's petition for post-conviction 
relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) on the general basis that, in light of the pleadings, 
answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
The specific grounds for dismissal of each of Petitioner's allegations are as set forth as 
follows: 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 1 
H:IPCRlbooth mot.wpd 
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1. Petitioner has never supplied Exhibit "A" (which has been incorporated by 
reference to both the original Petition and the Amended Petition) to either the 
Court or the Respondent. 
2. Neither the original Petition or Amended Petition is verified; nor are Affidavits of 
Fact attached, filed, or provided. The Petition! Amended Petition fail to conform 
to Idaho Code §19-4902. There is no factual basis to support any of Petitioner's 
claims, which are speculatory and conclusory in nature. 
3. The transcripts of the criminal proceedings and the Clerk's Record, that were filed 
with the State's Request for Judicial Notice on November 16,2007, support a 
finding of effective representation, and prove that Petitioner can not meet the 
standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (19824) and its progeny. 
Counsel conducted adequate discovery, engaged in meaningful preparation, filed 
and argue appropriate motions and made meaningful arguments at sentencing. 
Counsel negotiated a way to avoid the Court finding of aggravating circumstances 
and/or imposed a fixed life sentence as a mandatory sentence. 
DATED this 3~aYOfMarCh 2008. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 2 
H:IPCR\booth mol wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to 
be delivered to the Defendant's attorney of record lJty placing said copy in the basket of Van 
Bishop in the Clerk's office on or about the ,~ day of March, 2008. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 3 
H:IPCR\booth mol wpd 
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VAN G. BISHOP 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 - 12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
ISBN 2740 
Attorney for Petitioner 
F I L f/ifD ___ A.M:~P.M. 
JUL 1 0 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
8 RAYNE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 











NOTICE OF FILING "EXHIBIT A" 
OF POST CONVICTION PETITION 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
---------------------------) 
COMES NOW, VAN G. BISHOP, of the LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP, attorney for 
the above-named Petitioner and submits herewith the second through fourth page of the memo 
counsel gave to petitioner in persuading him to plea with assurance of no more than a 15 year fixed 
sentence. (Reference page 3, 7-f of Amended Petition) 
DATED this 9th_day of July 2008. 
NOTICE OF FILING "EXHIBIT A" ORlGINAL Page 1 of 1 
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MEMO 
TO: TREVOR BOOTH 
FROM: RLH 
DATE: MAY 9,4005 
SUBJECT: Punishment for Murder 
Idaho Code Sec. 18-4004 sets forth the statutory basis of sentencing for murder. That 
statute is as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 [Sentencing in capital cases; not 
applicable here] and 19-2515A [Imposition of death sentence on mentally 
retarded persons; not applicable here] Idaho Code, every person gUilty of 
murder of fIrst degree murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment 
for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the 
prosecuting attorney fIled a written notice of intent to seek the death penalty as 
required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and provided 
further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall impose a 
sentence. If a jury or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition of death 
would be unjust, the court shall impose a fIxed life sentence. If a jury, or the 
court if a jury is waived, does not fInd a statutory circumstance beyond a . 
reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a 
life sentence with a with a minimum period of confInement of not less than ten 
(10) years during which period of confInement the offender shall not be eligible 
for parole or discharge or credit for reduction of sentence for good conduct, 
except for meritorious service. Every person gUilty of murder in the second 
degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life. 
What this statute means is that-upon a conviction for fIrst degree murder, if the jury or 
a judge if jury is waived, fInds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt the sentence is death. However, if the prosecutor does not seek death, 
as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, then the 
sentence is a fIxed life s.entence. That means the person sentenced will spend his life in 
prison and will die there; At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge indicated to 
the prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury that will ask the 
question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of fIrst degree murder? Yes 
or No. The verdict form will also contain the same -question for second degree murder 
and for manslaughter. If the jury finds you guilty of first degree murder, the verdict 
MEMO - Page 1 000032 
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form would contain the further question of the jury: "do you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance.? Yes or No. Since the trial judge intends 
to submit that question to the jury as part of the verdict form and if the jury finds an 
aggravating circumstance as a part of the verdict, then the sentence to be imposed by 
the judge, notwithstanding all the evidence there is in mitigation, a fixed life sentence 
which means you will spend the rest of your life in prison. 










The defendant was previously convicted of murder; 
At the time the murder was committed, another murder was committed; 
The defendant knowingly created a risk of death to many persons; 
The murder was for hire; 
The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; 
By committing the murder the defendant exhibited utter disregard for 
life; 
The murder was committed in the commission of rape, arson, burglary, 
kidnapping or mayhem or acted with reckless indifference to life; 
The defendant has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
continue to be a continuing threat; 
The murder was committed against a law enforcement officer; 
The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness. 
Some of these potentially apply and others do not. The ones that may apply are e, f, 
and h. The rest do not apply to this case. My experience has been with murder cases 
that it is not too difficult for a finding to be made that the murder is heinous (a murder 
by definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or alternatively that by 
committing the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life. Although it 
might be a stretch, by committing one murder, a person has demonstrated that he can 
commit murder especially in the context of a drug related action. 
The bottom line is this. If you are convicted of first degree murder, not a death penalty 
case, but the jury finds an aggravating circumstance, you will spend the rest of your life 
in prison. I have had some preliminary discussions with the prosecutor and they may 
be willing to waive anything to do with an "aggravating circumstance" in return for a 
plea of gUilty to the murder of Kellum. What that means is that the minimum term of 
confinement is 10 years but thereafter you would be eligible for parole. However. 
under the State of Idaho's sentencing scheme for all felony crimes, the Judge is 
required to impose a fixed term to be followed by an indeterminate term for a total term 
of X number of years or months. For example a sentence could be 2 + 3 for a total of 
five years. What that means is the person would have to serve two years but would be 
eligible for parole after two although the Board of Corrections could keep the person 
incarcerated for another 1, 2 or 3 years until the sentence was maxed out. Again 
typically, once the fixed term is served, the Board of Corrections releases the inmate on 
parole. At this point I am confident the prosecutor.will not request the judge to find an 
MEMO - Page2 
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aggravating circumstance which would mean no fIxed life sentence. The prosecutor has 
not indicated nor agreed to a minimum term of ten. The prosecutor could recommend a 
greater term than ten, and the judge would not be bound by the fIxed term of ten years 
and could impose a greater term than ten years. However, the fIxed term would be for 
a fInite number and you would be eligible for parole once that number was served. My 
effort would be to present mitigating facts to the judge which would get you the ten 
number or the least number above ten as possible. Knowing the judge as I do, I do not 
think that number would exceed fIfteen. 
What does this mean in terms of decision making? Based upon the evidence as 
currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the jury is going to return a 
verdict of guilty. The evidence is that the shooter went into the house through the back 
door. The door was ajar when the police entered the house. The police have 
statements from Kellum identifying you as the shooter, not just once but he reiterated 
your identity as the shooter at least six times. Those statements of Kellum are 
admissible in evidence as a dying declaration to the hearsay rule. I have explained that 
rule to you previously. The police will be able to use your statement that you had gone 
over to the house, heard arguing and shots being fIred from in the house even though 
you stated you did not enter the house. However an inference is going to be drawn and 
the prosecutor will argue that (1) the shooter did not enter the house through the front 
door because (a) the door was locked when the police arrived, and (b) there were no 
footprints in the snow leading up to the front door; (2) that when the neighbors in the 
back apartment left that morning no foot prints were observed in the snow; (3) that the 
police will testify that there was only one set of footprints leading up to the back door, 
the same foot prints led over to the end of the drive way and back towards the back 
door, and fInally the same set of foot prints ostensibly then ran from the backdoor 
across the yard out onto the street; and (4) the footprints match up to your shoe. The 
inference to be drawn from these facts is that you are the shooter to the exclusion of 
anyone else. Otherwise there would have been other footprints in the snow and there 
were none, and you in fact stated you were there even though you deny the shooting. If 
you did not do the shooting why did Kellum identify you as being the shooter. While I 
can make argument that there is no evidence you were in the house other than Kellum's 
statement, that the weapon has not been located and the argument can be made that the 
real shooter has it, that is somewhat weak in comparison. If the matter goes to trial, 
you would have to testify as to what you have said all along. But testifying means 
being subject to cross examination and having to explain the lack of other peoples 
footprints in the snow, why Kellum identifIed you and dealing with motive. The motive 
ostensibly being the fact you owed Kellum a lot of money. Although it could be argued 
other people may have had motive to kill Kellum, particularly because of his acts and 
conduct and being heavily involved in drug dealing, there is no hard evidence that 
implicates anyone else. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability of 
facing a fIxed life sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. If you 
enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated circumstances, or not 
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requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances. then you would face a 
minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever greater period the judged 
might impose. I have indicated above I do not think the Judge would impose a term 
greater that fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in that context means 
thirty years. My recommendation is because of the strong risk of spending the rest of 
your life in prison, a plea agreement may be your best option. Please consider and let 
me know as soon as possible. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. eUlET DATE: JULY 14, 2008 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 












STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 















CASE NO. CV 2006-8651*C 
TIME: 9:30A.M. 
REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting 
CASE NO. CR 2005-1658*C 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion for summary disposition in 
the above entitled matter, the plaintiff did not appear in court but was represented by 
counsel, Mr. Van Bishop, and the State was represented by counsel, Mr. Gearld Wolff, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. 
The Court reviewed prior proceedings and noted the pending motion. 
COURT MINUTES 
JULY 14, 2008 Page 1 
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Mr. Bishop advised the Court that he had filed Exhibit A with the Court, however, 
the first page of that exhibit was missing when provided to the Court and counsel. 
Therefore, he was submitting the first page at this time. 
The Court so noted and indicated that it would have page one attached to the 
exhibit in the Courts file. 
In answer to the Courts inquiry, each of counsel indicated they were prepared to 
proceed with argument. 
Mr. Wolff presented argument in support of the motion for summary disposition. 
Mr. Bishop responded with argument in objection to the motion. 
Mr. Wolff presented additional argument in support of the motion for summary 
disposition. 
The Court presented findings of fact and conclusions of law and indicated it 
would grant the motion for summary disposition with regard to all matters excluding 9 
(a) and 7 (f) of the petition, however, verification would be needed from Mr. Booth with 
regard to those matters. Therefore, the Court would allow thirty (30) days to begin upon 
filing of the order, to get said verification and would allow counsel to do additional 
briefing. 
The Court ordered this matter set for status conference for October 2, 2008 at 
9:00 a.m. which would also be utilized as a scheduling conference. 
COURT MINUTES 
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Mr. Wolff requested the Court prepare a written notice under State vs. Flores 
which would be sent to Mr. Booth in Texas as he had not been present at the 
proceeding. 
The Court indicated the petition would be dismissed absent verification within 
thirty (30) days. 
The Court directed Mr. Wolff to prepare an order for the Court's signature 
containing the portions of the motion which were granted and the Court would prepare a 
notice of intent to dismiss which would include the time frame for verification. 
The Court indicated there would be a ruling, however, it would not be a final 
ruling under Civil Rule 35, therefore, and the appeal time would not be tolling until the 
final order is entered. 
COURT MINUTES 
JULY 14, 2008 Page 3 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 
SECTION 19-4906(c) 
Case No. CV2006-8651 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court on the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition on July 14,2008. Van Bishop appeared on behalf of the 
plaintiff and Gerald Wolff appeared on behalf of the defendant. Notice was given 
in open court to the defendant that this Court intends to dismiss the Petition 
unless the Petitioner verifies under oath Sections 7F and 9A of the Amended 
Petition. The Court further allows the defendant 30 days from the date of this 
order which to bring that aspect of the Petition into compliance with Idaho Code 
Section 19-4902 and Idaho Code Section 19-4903. 
BE IT SO ORDERED, this 1- ( day of ~~8. , 
.-1/1,~1 /. 
.. ,1;,./ I' 
tG . 0 . ulet 
/' strict Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correcW~f the foregoing order 
was forwarded to the following persons on this d- f July, 2008. 
Van G. Bishop 
Attorney at Law 
203 _12th Ave Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Id 83686 
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DAVID L. YOUNG, ISB #3679 JUL 292008 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
CANYONcou 
C ATKINSON~~P~~~RK 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV2006-08651 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT AS TO ALLEGATIONS 
) 7 (t) AND 9(a), NOTICE OF INTENT 
) UNDER I.C. §19-4906(b) AND ORDER 
) SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE 
) 
This matter came before the court on July 14, 2008, on Respondent's State ofIdaho 
Motion for Summary Judgment under I.C. §19-4906(c). Petitioner was represented by Van 
Bishop. Respondent was represented by Gearld L. Wolff. After hearing the arguments of 
counsel, reviewing the Petition, Answer, Motion and the records and transcripts previously 
submitted from the underlying criminal case of State v. Trevor Booth, CR2005-01658, Supreme 
Court docket number 32289, the Court concludes that partial summary judgment should be 




paragraphs 7(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g), and paragraphs 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d) of the Petition as 
there are no genuine issues of material fact as to those allegations and Respondent is entitled to 
judgment on those allegations as a matter oflaw. 
Petitioner has failed to verify the Petition as to these allegations, has failed to support 
them with admissible evidence or affidavits, and can not carry his burden under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) of proving either deficient performance of counselor 
prejudice. 
As to the allegations contained in paragraphs 7(t) and 9(a), the court concludes that 
Petitioner has failed to verify or otherwise support his Petition with admissible evidence or 
affidavits. The Court concludes that Petitioner could potentially have viable claims and should 
be allowed an opportunity under 1. C. § 19-4906(b) to comply with statutory requirements of 
factually supporting his allegations. Notice is hereby given of the Court's Intent to Dismiss the 
Petition if Petitioner does not adequately support the Petitioner's allegations and verify the 
Petition. The Court hereby grants THIRTY (30) days for compliance with the requirements of 
the UPCRA by Petitioner, due to Petitioner being housed out of State by the Department of 
Corrections. 
THEREFORE, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to 
allegations in paragraphs 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(e), 7(g), 9(b), 9(c) and 9(d). The Petition is 
DISMISSED as to those allegations. It is further ORDERED that Petitioner be given thirty (30) 




support the allegations of paragraphs 7(t) and 9(a). This matter is hereby set for status 
conference on Octob~ 2~, at 9:00 a.m. before this Court. 







VAN G. BISHOP ISBN 2740 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 - 12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
_F __ ' A.~9.M. 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
AUG t 8 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B RAYNE, DEPUTY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. ) 
-------------------------) 
CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
VERIFICATION OF THE FIRST 
AMffiNDED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF ______ -J) 
I, TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, Petitioner in the above matter have read and understand the AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF filed by my attorney, VAN G. BISHOP, of the LAW 
OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP, and affirm that the allegations contained therein are true and correct to the 
best of my knowledge. 
Dated: August 11, 2008 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, PETITIONER 
NOTARY 
Trevor James Booth having identified himself too me as the Petitioner herein and signing before me this 11 th 
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VAN G. BISHOP ISBN 2740 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 - 12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
Attorney for Petitioner 
RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF cANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 








VERIFICATION OF THE FIRST 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
------------------- ) 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
)SS 
COUNTYOF ____________ ~} 
VERIFICATION 
I, TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, Petitioner in the above matter have read and understand the AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF filed by my attorney, VAN G. BISHOP, of the LAW 
OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP, and affirm that the allegations contained therein are true and correct to the 
best of my knowledge. 
Dated: August 11, 2008 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, PETITIONER 
NOTARY 
Trevor James Booth having identified himself too me as the Petitioner herein and signing before me this 
11 th day of August, 2008 at Littlefield, Texas. 





~~!~.'~~~z:~ HAYlEE KA~HERINE FRENCH 
: }J': - Notal'( Public. State of Te)(as 
~",-;. MV Commission E)(pires 
:;;J.~~i' June la, 2012 <:J~.~~h 
NOAA ()RTHESTAT~F TEXAS 
Commission expires: \.0 \ l ~\a... 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
1. Place of detention if in custody: Idaho State Correctional Institute, currently housed at Bill 
Clayton Detention Center, Littlefield, Texas .. 
2. Name and location of Court which imposed judgment/sentence: Honorable Judge Gregory 
M. Culet, District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Canyon, Caldwell, Idaho. 
3. The case number and the offense for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) CASE NO. CR2005-I658-C 
(b) Offenses Convicted: First Degree Murder 
4. The (a) date upon which sentence was imposed and the (b) term of the 
sentence: 
(a) Date of sentence: Hearing held August 11,2005, Judgment filed on August 16, 
2005. 
(b) Terms of sentence: Thirty (30) years fixed, and a subsequent indeterminate 
period of confinement not to exceed life. 
5. Check whether a fmding of guilty was made after a plea: 
(a) Of guilty: X 
(b) Of not guilty: 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? YES 
7. State concisely all grounds on which you base your application for post conviction 
relief: 
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(b) Failure to investigate and interview potential witnesses in police reports, and which the 
defendant and his family provided which would substantiate the treats the victim made to defendant and 
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day of August, 2008 at Littlefield, Texas. 
NOTARY FOR TIlE STATE OF TEXAS 
Commission expires: _______ _ 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
1. Place of detention if in custody: Idaho State Correctional Institute, currently housed at Bill 
Clayton Detention Center, Littlefield, Texas .. 
2. Name and location of Court which imposed judgment/sentence: Honorable Judge Gregory M. 
Culet, District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Canyon, Caldwell, Idaho. 
3. The case number and the offense for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) CASE NO. CR200S-16S8-C 
(b) Offenses Convicted: First Degree Murder 
4. The (a) date upon which sentence was imposed and the (b) term of the 
sentence: 
(a) Date of sentence: Hearing held August 11, 200S, Judgment filed on August 16, 
200S. 
(b) Terms of sentence: Thirty (30) years fixed, and a subsequent indeterminate period 
of confinement not to exceed life. 
S. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
(a) Of guilty: X 
(b) Of not guilty: 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? YES 
7. State concisely all grounds on which you base your application for post conviction 
relief: 
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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(b) Failure to investigate and interview potential witnesses in police reports, and which the 
defendant and his family provided which would substantiate the treats the victim made to defendant and 
defendant's family. Additionally witnesses which would have substantiated the victim's activity in the drug 
trade in Canyon County. 
(c) Failure to obtain expert advice as to the forensics evidence at the scene of the offense and 
the reenactment of the crime. Failed to assess and analyze the time line for which Defendant was at the 
residence as evidenced by the neighbors leaving and returning and the footsteps in the snow. All of this 
analysis and expert assistance would have substantiated defendants statement to counsel and supported a 
reduced charge of manslaughter or at most 2nd. Degree murder .. 
(d) Failure to interview members of law enforcement drug enforcement as to evidence 
beneficial to defendant in reducing the charge to that of manslaughter. 
(e) Failure to File a Motion and argue for withdrawal of guilty plea once the sentence was 
imposed. 
(f) Coercive and threatening tactics used against defendant and defendants family assuring 
them a ten (10) year sentence ifhe were to plead and a fixed life sentence ifhe took the case to trial. (Exhibit 
A attached to initial filing) 
(g) Conflict of Interest: Counsel for the defendant had a conflict of interest with the 
defendant in that counsel was the victim's landlord. Counsel owned the real property, rented by the victim 
where the crime occurred and was active in collection of rents, arranging for maintenance as a landlord. 
This conflict was not told to the defendant until the pressure to enter a plea was conducted late in the court 
process. 
8. Prior to this Petition, have you filed with respect to any conviction? 
(a) Any petitions in State or Federal Courts for Habeas Corpus? NO 
(b) Any other petitioners, motions or application in this or any other Court? 
YES - A Rule 35 Motion for reduction of Sentence which was summarily 
denied without hearing. 
9. If your application is based upon failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state 
concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests. Includes, but 
is not limited to: 
(a) Defendant was represented by the Private Counsel, Richard Harris. CounSel approached 
, • '. \. , \ \ > ~ 1" ' 
the case as a plea bargain-rather than putting forth the necesm time, e~qJ!t,and investigati01Ho prepare die 
case for trial. The Defendant's grandmother made contact with counsel 'after the initial arraignment to pay 
money towards the trial and was advised by counsel that this case will not go to trial. Counsel in analyzing 
theirase 011 initial visit ap~ teview o~~e . .perceived facts, d,~t~rmined ~t ~r court would sentence the 
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defendant to ten (10) years and at most fifteen (15) years fixed with an Indetenninate Life. Counsel was 
aware of the victim's criminal activities in the drug trade in making this detennination. Counsel, however, 
did not investigate, document and obtain the necessary witnesses to prepare the case for trial should plea 
negotiations breakdown or fail. The state filed a Motion for Special Verdict Fonn, to which counsel for 
defendant prepared a memo outlining section 18-4004 I.C. (not applicable in this case where death penalty 
was not sought) rather than filing an objection to the requested instruction. Counsel further used the memo 
in coercing the defendant to enter a plea to First Degree Murder advising the defendant that the court would 
only sentence him to ten (10) years but that ifhe were to go to trial there was a possibility that he could serve 
a fixed life sentence. Counsel also advised the defendant's mother, father and sister the same ten year 
sentence would be imposed. The defendant's position up until the coercive action was "I have nothing to 
loose by going to trial n. Death pen&lty was not an option and the evidence to be presented at trial would 
show that the case was one of manslaughter or at most 2nd degree murder. Counsel had not prepared for trial 
and was not in a position to go to trial on the date of the Status Conference when the plea was entered. 
(b) Counsel did not contact nor interview witnesses which the defendant and the defendant's 
parents and family provided to counsel who could have shown the coercive and threatening actions made by 
the victim to the defendant and the direct threat to his family. 
(c) Counsel failed to evaluate the evidence and witnesses which if presented would show a 
real possibility of a reduction of the charge to one of manslaughter or 2nd degree murder, even after continual 
requests from the defendant, his parents and sister. An evaluation of the hard evidence, including the 
neighbors leaving and return, the footprints in the snow would have shown the minimal time that defendant 
was at the house where the offense took place. Additionally, forensics review of the materials for the 
silencer at the sink would show that the victim may have prepared the weapon himself, and a reenactment of 
the firing in the residence would have shown the incident occurred as the defendant had stated to counsel. 
(d) Counsel did not prepare the defendant's family or any other witness for the defendant for 
the sentencing hearing. The defendant's mother was totally caught off guard at being a potential witness at 
the sentencing hearing. She had not been interviewed by counselor advised as to what types of questions he 
would ask, nor was she advised of the cross-examination which she would face. None of the defendant's 
family or friends were contacted as potential witnesses or prepared to be a witness. At sentencing counsel 
did not object to the mother's victim impact statement when she became personal and threatening to the 
defendant and exceeded the pennissible content of victim's impact. Counsel did not present mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing hearing. Defendant had many accomplishments as stated in the memorandum in 
support of his Rule 35 Motion which counsel could have presented along with other accomplishments of the 
defendant. 
10. Are you seeking leave to Pr,oceed.in fonna pauperis? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No XX 
11. State specifically the relief you seek: To have the plea of guilty set aside and the matter 
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rescheduled for trial to pursue all legal issues in the criminal matter. 
12. Petitioner respectfully reserves the right to supplement this Post Conviction Petition with an 
affidavit at a later time and respectfully requests a hearing on his Post Conviction Petition. 
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2008. 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
The undersigned does hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany st. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
___ U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
XX Personally delivered 
___ Telecopy/fax 
DATED this _----''--___ day of August, 2008. 
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12. Petitioner respectfully reserves the right to supplement this Post Conviction Petition with an 
affidavit at a later time and respectfully requests a hearing on his Post Conviction Petition. 
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2008. 
~ 
/.~ 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
___ D. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
XX Personally delivered 
___ Telecopy/fi~~~ 
DA TED this.6-'lp'-____ day of August, 2008. 




VAN G. BISHOP ISBN 2740 
LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP 
203 -12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
F '-A&~M 
Telephone: (208) 465-5411 
Facsimile: (208) 465-5881 
AU6 1 8 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
a RAYNE, DEPUTY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF cANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










AFFIDAVIT OF TREVOR 
BOOTH IN SUPPORT OF 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AFFIDAVIT OF TREVOR BOOTH 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
)SS 
COUNTYOF __________ ~) 
I Trevor James Booth having been duly sworn hereby state and declare that: 
1. I am the defendant! Petitioner in the Post Conviction Petition and am currently at the Idaho 
State Correctional Institute, currently being housed at Bill Clayton Detention Center, Littlefield, Texas .. 
2. I pled guilty to First Degree Murder only after my attorney Richard Harris threatened 
me with a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted on going to trial. Mr. Harris told me that the judge had told 
him that he would give the jury a special verdict form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. Harris 
told me as well as my family that the jury would fmd an aggravating factor and that the Court would 
then be bound to sentence me to a fixed life sentence. 
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3. I knew Mr. Harris was not ready for trial. That my grandmother had asked how much 
money he needed and he told her that the case was not going to trial before he gave me the memo dated 
May 9, 4005. 
4. I also knew that Mr. Harris had not contacted the witnesses which I had given him for my 
defense and without those witnesses I could be found guilty. 
5. Mr. Harris told me and assured me that I would get only 10 years if! pled guilty. He told 
me he knows the Judge and that he was sure I would only get 10 years. 
6. I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not intentionally shoot the victim. I never 
wanted to plead guilty to the charge. I only plead guilty because Mr. Harris told me I would get a Fixed 
Life Sentence and that the Judge would be bound to give it to me and if I plead guilty I would only get 10 
years. I also knew Mr. Harris was not prepared to go to trial and had not submitted my witnesses and had 
not contacted them. 
DATED this 11 th day of August, 2008. 
~442=Z ~ 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, Petitioner 
NOTARY 
Trevor James Booth having identified himself to me as the Petitioner herein and signing before me this 11 th 
day of August, 2008 at Littlefield, Texas. ~~
NOTAR OR THESTATE~FTEXAS 
Commission expires: \s \ \~ lcNL 
HArul ICATHEIINf FIENCH , 
NotJty Pu.blic:, Stile of TexIS 
My Commission Elcpires 
June II. 2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany st. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
___ D. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
XX Personally delivered 
___ Telecopy/fax 
DATED this _~ ____ day of August, 2008. 






DAVID L. YOUNG, ISB #3679 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
~kE o P.M. 
1115 Albany Street SEP 09 2008 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J TUCKER, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 








) ANSWER AND/OR RESPONSE TO 
) VERIFICATION OF AMENDED 




COMES NOW, GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the 
Respondent, State of Idaho, who files this Response to Petitioner's Verification of the First 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
I. 
Respondent hereby reasserts the Answer previously filed herein on December 21, 
2007 and incorporates it herein by this reference. 
ANSWER 1 
H:\CRIMINAL WORK\BOOTH ANSWER AND OR RESPONSE. wpd 
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II. 
Respondent hereby denies all factual allegations contained in the Verification. 
Respondent specifically invokes the law of the case as created by the Court's Order of July 29, 
2008, granting Partial Summary Judgment and moves to strike all allegations, except those 
applicable to Paragraph 7(f) and 9(a). All other matters have been resolved in favor or 
Respondent and are not subject to further litigation herein. 
III. 
Respondent, State ofIdaho alleges that the Verification contains speculation, 
conjecture and legal assertions that can not be "verified" and moves to strike those non-factual 
allegations from the Verification. 
IV. 
Respondent reserves the right to submit counter-affidavits to the Verification, but 
alleges affirmatively that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally effective as shown by 
the records and transcripts of the proceedings in State v. Trevor Booth, CR05-1658C, including 
Exhibits "A" and "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Respectfully submitted this ~y of September, 2008. 
ANSWER 2 
H:\CRlMlNAL WORK.\BOOTH ANSWER AND OR RESPONSE.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing ANSWER to 
be delivered to the Defendant's attorney of record by placing said copy in Richard Harris's basket 
in the Clerk's office on or about the <ghay of September, 2008. 
ANSWER 3 
H:ICRlMINAL WORKIBOOTH ANSWER AND OR RESPONSE.wpd 
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RECEIVED ifnc! A.~ E o P.M. 
RICHARD L. HARRIS 
ATI'ORNEY AT LAW 
1023 Arthur Street 
P.O. Box 1438 
Caldwell. Idaho 83606 
Phone: (208) 459-1588 
Fax: (208) 459-1300 
ISB No. 1387 
JUN 1 0 2005 
CCPA. 
JUN - 9 2005 
~ANYON COUNTY CLERK 
hY ~DEPUTY 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. CR-2oo5-1658*C 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 
) PURSUANT TO I.C.R. ll(D) (3) 




I have been informed by my attorney and in open court on this date of my constitutional 
rights in the above-entitled case, and I have read and fully understood the following. 
I have received and read a copy of the Information and understand the nature of the 
charges made against me. I have told my attorney all I know about the matters referred to in it. 
My attorney has explained to me the nature of the charges against me, my constitutional 
rights, and the punishment that could be imposed by the court upon my conditional plea of 
guilty. 
I understand that if I plead to any count or counts in the Information or Indictment: 
a I would be presumed under the law to be innocent of the charges against me in 
such count or counts; 
b. I would be entitled to a speedy ,public jury trial by an impartial jury in which the 
burden would be upon the State to establish my guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to the 
satisfaction of all twelve (12) jurors; and 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO LC.R. 11 
(D) (3) AND (4) BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT - 1 
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c. Upon such trial 1) I would be entitled to remain silent and no inference could be 
drawn against me because of my silence; 2) I could, if I wished, testify on my own behalf; 3) I 
would be entitled to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against me; and 4) I would be 
entitled to compulsory process of the court to obtain witnesses to testify and evidence to be 
offered in my defense. 
I understand that if my conditional plea of gUilty to any count or counts is accepted by the 
court, I give up the foregoing rights with respect to such count or counts and the court will have 
the same power to sentence me as if a jury had brought in a verdict of guilty with respect to such 
count or counts. 
My decision to conditionally plead guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I have not bee 
induced to conditionally plead gUilty by any force, coercion, pressure, or fear. 
My plea of guilty is conditional and made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (d) (3) and 
,(4). Should the Court accept the plea agreement, the Court shall advise me personally in open 
court that the Court cannot follow the plea agreement and give me the opportunity to withdraw 
my Plea of Guilty and reset the matter for trail. 
I understand that my plea of guilty is subject to the following conditions: 
a.) I will plead to the offense of First Degree Murder involving the death of Leonard 
Kellum which occurred on or about January 16,2005 in the City of Caldwell, Canyon County, 
Idaho .. 
b.) That the Prosecuting Attorney will not seek and waives the right to seek an 
"aggravated circumstance" as that term is referenced in Idaho Code 18-4004. 
c.) That the Court will make no finding of an aggravated circumstance as that term is 
used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the purposes of sentencing 
d.) That the sentencing range to be imposed by the Court is a minimum fixed term of 
ten years up to life. 
e.) That the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the sound discretion of the Court. 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO I.c.R. 11 
CD) (3) AND (4) BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT - 2 
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'. , .. 
I am not under the influence of any substance, such as narcotic or alcohol, that would 
affect my ability to understand the nature and consequences of my action in entering a 
conditional guilty plea. 
~- 3-05 
Date Defendant 
I, the attorney for the above-named defendant, have reviewed the foregoing with him, 
have explained to his the nature of the charges against him, his constitutional rights, and the 
punishment that could be imposed upon his conditional guilty plea. 
Date Attorney for Defendant 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 11 
(D) (3) AND (4) BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT - 3 
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, 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Dated: This -'4- day of June, 2005 
~~ 
r:::.v GEARLD L. WOLFF 
Deputy Prosecutor For Canyon County 
CONDmONAL PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 11 
(D) (3) AND (4) BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT - 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. Case No. CR-05-01658*C 
TREVOR J. BOOTH, 
Defendant. 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
JUNE 9, 2005 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
by: CHRIS TOPMILLER 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: RICHARD L. HARRIS 
REPORTED BY; 
1023 Arthur Street 
Post Office Box 1438 
Caldwell, Idaho 8~606 




STATE OF IDAHO 
!N THZ SUPREME COURT OF T*~ STATE OF IDAHO 
'~'$ • Supreme Court: 
Cockst No. 32299 
TR.':;VOF. BOO"!"H, 
Ti\.;'NSCRI~T OW APP~AL 
THI~O JUD!CIAL D!ST~ICT 
CAN'f.'ON COUNT'{, STATE OF IDAHO 
F"OR R.ES ?OI>JDEH'T : 
VhN G. BISHOI' 
203 12~h Ave. Rd., See. a 
Nampa, Idaho 83696 
:"AWR£NC£ G. WA.SDEN 
Scac. o~ Zdaho Attorney Gene:al 
St:~t.ehouse 
Soi ••• rdaho 93720 
,<t./OHNit L. WiO£ GIER, C.S.P, •• 73, R.P.A. 
Not:.a::y Public 
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Caae No. CR-05-0165S-C 
TReVOR J. SOOTH. 
CHANGE: O!" PLEA 
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N,?t::.~ry Public 
June 9, 2005 
Case No. CR-OS-01658*C 







JUNE 9, 2005, 10:08 a.m. 
4 THE COURT: Now, we are back on the record. 
S We are taking up the case of State versus Trevor Booth, 
6 2005-1658. 
7 In this particular case, there is a couple ef 
8 matters. One, the last recess I took was simply to look 
9 for an alternative date for sentencing on the matter 
10 that would allow the State's ·,Jitnesses and victim's 
11 family to be present. ~~d the alternative date, aiter 
12 going over the calendar with my secretary and \'1ith 
13 counsels' calendars, because there is other trials in 
14 front of other judges that they have, \ie'Ve ceme up with 
15 a sentencing time of August 11 at 1:30. 
16 Does that work for people that have to come 
17 in and for people that want to be present? 
18 MR. TOPMILLER: Yes, it does. 
19 THE COURT: Thanl: you. Now, with that in 
20 mind, there has been a -- my understanding is, there is 
21 going to be a change of plea on this case today. The 
22 case is set to go to jury trial next week, but there 
23 will be a change of plea. 
24 There is an agreement that was reached 
25 between the parties for the -- the State has filed a 
1 request or motion to pursue a presentation of proof to 
2 the jury regarding certain aggravating factors that has 
3 a bearing on the sentencing options available. 
4 Pursuant to your agreement, it's my 
5 understanding -- and I'll let counsel explain this 
6 further -- that's going to be withdrawn, there will be a 
7 plea of guilty to the current charge with the 
8 understanding, pursuant to your agreement, that the 
9 sentencing range/ then, is that of -- under the current 
10 status, there is a ·life sentence, not less than ten 
11 years, and then the Court -- and both sides are free to 
12 argue for anything else in between, but the sentencing 












is an automatic life sentence, but not less than ten 
years. And then it is discretionary with the court, 
based on arguments on both sides and presentation of 
evidence -- as to lihere that would be in terms of the 
fixed time and indeterminate time -- is that your 
understanding? 
MR. H~_~IS: Generally yes, Judge. What 
Hr. Wolff has indicated to me that the starting point 
would be a fixed ten, and that could -- and ';Inat this 
conditional Rule 11 plea is, is also binding the court, 











































.:"5 I read the statute, it seems to be more 
orcaa tha~ jest a jury, because it talks about both the 
~ury and the court or the jury or the court finding an 
3ggravated circumstance. 
And so as I read the statute, eVen though a 
9~:a is entered, the court could find an aggravated 
circlli~s:ance that would make it a fixed life sentence. 
?nd 'tihat this Rule 11 plea agreement does that's been 
sig~ed off by my client, myself, and the prosecuting 
attorney, is that it essentially locks the court into a 
position where the court would not find an aggravated 
drcu.'1lstance so that the sentencing range would be 
another statute of a minimum of ten, it would be a 
determinate ten follOl~ed by up to life. 
Or it could be, depending on what the court 
does, it could be a 12, it could be a 15, but that would 
not be determined until we get to the sentencing hearing 
and the Court vlould have some discretion in that regard. 
It is my belief and feeling that based upon all the 
mitigation and evidence that I am aware of, that the 
caun: -- and we are going to request the Court to go by 
the statute itself, which would be a determinate 10, so 
that there would be an eligibility for parole 
;:hereafter. 
THE COURT: Just so I understand this --
10 
·.ell, I understand, but I \iant to make sure we are 
clear: In order for that aggravating factor to occur to 
be found, it would have to be proven, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and by proceeding the way you are 
doing, it puts it into the standard sentencing 
proceeding, 50 if I accept this agreement, you are 
correct, when we get there, the sentence the defendant 
would be facing would be not less than 10 to life. 
MR. HA.qRIS: Right. 
THE COURT: And then the issue that both 
sides would be arguing for, would be what would be the 
determinate portion of that sentence. 
MR. HARRIS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And then that would be presented 
co me at the sentencing: is that correct? 
MR. TOPMILLER: Judge, yes, but one thing: 
You could stil: impose fixed life if you saw fit. 
THE COURT: Oh, yes. aut my point is, there 
are certain ~spects about that statute that make 
mandatory certain penalties. 
t1R. TOPHILLER: That's what Hr. Harris is 
trying to avoid. 
THE COURT: And -- and that's the nature of 
your agreement, 'Ihich -- and I think once the 91ea is 
entered to this and lie go to the regular sentencing 
11 
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hear:ng, tne rules of evidence aren't applicable and, 
therefore, tnere is not going to be any position to ma}:e 
a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, regarding 
aggravating ractors. 
Just, I would be balancing all those ractors 
that I find in there based on the sentencing criteria 
that traditionally judges look at. .~d your arguments 
and presentations and victim impact statements, factor~ 
like that, I would take that into account. 
.n.nd then I would be sentencing betlVeen those 
parameters, anywhere from fiXed term of 10 with a life, 
indeterminate terms, to a greater amount of fixed --
and, you m: right, it could be up to a fi:ted life 
sentence if I find it aggravating enough, but I am 
not bound -- I am not required to issue that sentence 
based on the factors, it is discretionary on my part 
based upon the arg~~ents and presentations presented: 
correct? 
HR. H&qRIS: It would seem to me, Judge, that 
because we are entering into -- we are avoiding -- if 
the court finds an aggravated circumstance --
THE COURT: aut we are talking -- I \;ant to 
make sure we understand this. I don't mean that 
statutory one, I mean I'm balancing under Idaho Code 
19-2521, and State versus Toohi11, in protecting the 
12 
public --
MR. H~_~~IS: I understand all those factors. 
THE COURT: That's what I'm talking about. 
MR. HARRIS: The reason vie are doing this is 
to avoid a fixed life sentence. 
THE COURT: Has the State indicated 'dnat you 
are limiting your recommendations to? 
MR. TOP1HLLER: We are not. 
I~R. HARRIS: Mr. Wolff has not done that. He 
has only indicated to me that in his review of prior 
sentences in Canyon County that that range is anywhere 
from ten to, I think, 25. So his recommendation \~ould 
be somewhere within that range. But, again, he hasn't 
committed at this point to doing anything. 
THE COURT: All right. So if I understand 
how you will proceed at this point then, you presented 
me a copy of your written agreement a moment ago that 
you stepped out -- I may ha'le left it on my deSK, but we 
have it on the record -- the follOlving 'dill occur: 
There will be a plea -- I will go over what 
the penalty range could be at that time so there is no 
misunderstanding as to what the range could be and then 
you can clarify that to me when ,Ie do that -- I will set 
the case for sentencing at a time that works for people 












































~rsssn:, and I ;,ant to make sure that' 5 available, 
cscaUSE they will have input into this, and then we will 
go to sentencing. 
And then what happens at that point, as 
~ounsel are aware, the State and the defense both 
present information -- evidence and information before 
che Court in argument as to what each side feels is a 
fair resolution. I will consider those factors and make 
a de;:ermin.'ltion as to ;,hat is appropriate and fair under 
the circumstances lii':.hin that rangE of judicial 
discretion -- , thin!: that's lihat you are talking about; 
is ~ha"C conec::, Hr. Harris? 
14R. HARRIS: Well, yeah. It's my 
understanding that it liould be within the range, but it 
would not be a fixed life. 
THE COURT: Okay. With that in mind, then, 
let's proceed. 
Mr. Harris, do you feel you have had 
sufficient :ime to discuss this with your client, 
lncluding the rights, defenses, and possible 
consequences of a guilty plea? 
MR. HARRIS: I believe I have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Do you feel there is a factual 
basis for me to accep: the plea? 
HR. H!t~RIS: I believe there is a factual 
14 
oasis :cr it, Judge. 
THE COURT: Now, any further record the State 
,lanes to make before I proceed to take the plea? Do you 
need to make a record today? 
HR. 70PHILLER: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: Now, the -- Hr. Booth, do you 
feel you have had sufficient time to discuss this with 
your attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: I need to ask you a series of 
questions before I even proceed to take the plea. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
THE COURT: Hov/ old are you now? 
THE DEFENDANT: 20. 
THE COURT: How far did you get in school? 
THE DEFENDANT: I graduated high school. 
THE COURT: Are you currently on any 
medications? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: In the past 24 hours, have you 
had any drugs or alcoholic beverage? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You were present in court a 
moment ago when your attorney discussed and the State 
discussed and presented to me the nature of this 
15 
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agreement, and that there is going to be a Sentencing 
hearing and both sides are free to argue Ivithin those 
parameters. But other than thar presentation, has there 
been anything else said or done to forcs you to plead 
guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: No one suggested that just 
because you plead guilty, r would be lenient ,lith you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, you understand, then, 'Ie 
just discussed this, that the ultimate sentence in the 
case would be determined at the sentencing hearing by 
me. I liill listen to tha presentations of both sides --
and, again, I am going to be sentencing liithin those 
parameters we just diSCUSSed. 
Do you understand that ultimately it will be 
up to me to make a final decision on that; do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: There are certain rights that 
you waive when ~ou plead guilty. And although you 
have been over these with your attorney, I 'llant to 
make sure you let me know on the record that you 
understand them. 
When you plead guilty to this charge, you 
16 
1 gi ve up your right to a jury trial on the charge; do 
2 you understand that? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: You give up your presumption of 
J innocence: do you understand that? 
6 THE D8FENDil.NT: Yes, sir. 
i THE COURT: You gi va up your right against 
8 selt-incrimination; do you understand that? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: You also give up your right to be 
11 confronted by witnesses and to cross-examine them 
12 regarding the charge and call witnesses on your Ol,n 
13 behalf regarding the underlying charge: do you 
14 understand that? 
15 THE DEfENDANT: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: You still have a sentencing 
17 hearing that you can put on information and testimony 
19 about, but regarding the case itself as to liherher you 
19 are guilty or not guilty, you waive that lihen you plead 
20 guilty; do you understand that? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
22 THE COURT: You also -- and I may have 
23 already addressed this, but I'm making sure -- you waive 




















THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: NOvl, you waive any defenses that 
you may have in addition :0 that, such as your right to 
:oa11:ng: any confessions or admissions made to the 
police or any searches or seizureS made by the poliCe; 
jo you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, you are not currently on 
probation or parole; is that correct? 
:HE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Once this gets on your record as 
a te~ony, in the fucure if you get new felony charges at 
any time, this could be used as part of an allegation of 
being a persistent violator of the law subjecting you to 
greater penalties for that further charge; do you 
understand that? 
T~E DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Once I accept the plea here and 
35 long as _ can agree to the parameters that counsel 
have presented in YOU! Rule 11 agreement, then you are 
not going to be able to withdraw your plea: do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
TgE COURT: Here's the nature of the charge 
that I am asking for your plea with regard to, 
18 
1 t1r. Booch. The charge is: On or about the 16th of 
2 January, 2005, in the county of Canyon, state of Idaho, 
3 that you did vlillfully, unlawfully, and deliberately 
4 ·.;ith premeditation, with malice aforethought, kill and 
5 murder Leonard Kellulll, a human being, by shooting him 
6 and inflicting i'lOunds from which he died. That's the 
1 ,latUre of ehe ct1arge. 
a How do you plead to that at this time? 
S THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Judge. 
10 THE COURT: You are pleading guilty freely 
11 and voluntarily because you did, in fact, commit the 
12 ,Jffense? 
13 THE DEFEND)I.NT: Yes, sir. 
14 THE COURT: I will accept the plea. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: I will order a presentence 
17 inVEstigation, and order this set for August 11 at 
18 1:30 p.m. I will block aside a half day for that 
19 sentencing hearing. 
20 My understanding is that accommodates people 
2~ ;,he wish to at:end, ilitnesses, those factors, and the 
22 v:'ccim's :'amily. 
23 I will order the presentence investigation, 
24 and ask that that oe done as soon as possible beforehand 
25 so counsel can submit it and be prepared to address any 
19 
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issue that chey see are in that. That's ~ight weeks 
out, 50 that should be enough time. But perhaps if --
you haVe indicated you rr.ay be able to contact them to 
see, make sure they can get it in early enough ahead of 
time. 
MR. TOPtHLLER: We are going to ask to have 
it expedited. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And this is for both 
sides so you can be prepared for the hearing, I want you 
to have time to prepare for that. 
Is there anything I havenlt addressed today, 
Hr. Harris, that needs to be addressed? 
!4R. HAI{RIS: Not that lim aware of, judge. I 
would like the conditional plea agreement filed with the 
Court. 
THE COURT: Certainly, and chat will be done. 
And anything else by :he State? 
MR. TOPMILLER: No. 
HR. H.1\RRIS: You still have that? 
MR. TOPMILLER: I do. 
THE COURT: I will haVe that filed at 
the present time and stamped by the clerk. 
Thank you. 
lIe are in recess, and the defendant is 
remanded back to the custody of the sheriff. 
20 
THE 9A!t.I1!'F: All t'ise. plea ••. 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. eUlET DATE: OCTOBER 2,2008 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
) COURT MINUTES 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO: CV 2006-8651*C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting 
) 
Respondent, ) DCRT 1 (948-953) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for status conference in the above-
entitled matter, the petitioner was not present, but represented by Mr. Van Bishop, and 
the respondent was represented by counsel, Mr. Gearld Wolff. 
The Court reviewed prior proceedings and noted that it had met with counsel in 
chambers prior to the hearing. It was the Courts understanding that counsel would like 
to have this matter set for evidentiary hearing on the post conviction relief. Additionally, 
the petitioner wished to participate via telephone as he did not want to be transported 
from the Texas facility where he is currently being held, and the officials at said facility 
indicated that would not be a problem. 
The Court ordered this matter set for evidentiary hearing for April 13, 2009 at 
9:00 a.m. 
COURT MINUTES 
OCTOBER 2, 2008 Page 1 
000067 
, 
Mr. Wolff advised the Court that he did not intend on filing a motion for summary 
disposition. 
The Court advised each of counsel to provide the Court with the preliminary 
information on the issues which needed to be addressed along with purposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. They should be provided thirty (30) days prior to the 
hearing and be provided in both a hard copy format as well as sent to the Courts e-mail 
address. 
The Court and counsel had further discretion regarding closing arguments and 
additional briefings preceding the actual hearing. 
The Court advised each of counsel that it would set dates for those matters to be 
submitted to the Court the day of the evidentiary hearing. 
COURT MINUTES 
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CASE NO. CV-2006-0008651-C 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Defendant. 
THIS COURT having set this matter for Hearing on Defendant's Petition for Post 
Conviction, to be heard on April 13, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter can be 
heard, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant be transported by the Canyon County 
Sheriffs Office from the Idaho Department of Corrections, on or before the 13th day of April, 
2009 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. to appear at the HEARING set before the District Court Judge 
GREGORY M. CULET at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
Trevor James Booth, Inmate # 78409, ISCI, Unit 13 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT / BOOTH! CANYON COUNTY 
000069 
1 
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT upon completion of said hearing; the Defendant 
shall be returned to the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections. 
DATED this!l-- day of Apri12009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of 
the within ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was delivered to the CANYON COUNTY 
SHERRIFFS OFFICE, CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE and VAN G. BISHOP 
by leaving a copy in their respective baskets at the Canyon County Courthouse and/or facsimile 
on this date. 
DATED this ~ day of April 2009. 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT / BOOTW CANYON COUNTY 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: April 13, 2009 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













CASE NO: CV-2006-8651-C 
TIME: 9:00 A.M. 




This having been the time heretofore set for evidentiary hearing in the above-
entitled matter, the petitioner was present in court with counsel Mr. Van Bishop and the 
respondent was represented by Mr. Kenneth Stringfield. 
The Court noted the case, parties present and determined counsel was prepared 
to proceed. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Bishop advised the Court there were no 
ireliminary motions to take up, but requested the Court take judicial review of the 
-':P:;wing documents in case number CR2005-01658*C: The Magistrate Arraignment 
r,:)m January 18, 2005; Substitution of Counsel from Mr. Harris filed January 20, 2005; 
i '.-)minary Hear:ng mim'te trom February 1, 2005; District Court Arraignment from 
000071. 
February 11, 2005; State's Motion in Limine filed April 18, 2005; the Motion to Suppress 
the Statement of the Defendant and Objection to the Request for the Motion in Limine 
regarding alibi filed April 26, 2005; Response to Alibi Defense filed May 12, 2005; the 
State's Sixth Supplemental Response to Discovery with specific regard to Tim Rainbolt, 
filed April 18, 2005; the Defendant's Response to Request for Discovery with specific 
regard to "no experts regarding forensics, limited witness and no witnesses mitigating 
threats or circumstances" filed May 16, 2005; the State's Motion for use of a Special 
Verdict Form filed May 18, 2005, coupled with the Court Minutes from May 6, 2005 and 
the Change of Plea on June 9, 2005 as well as the Rule 11 filed on June 9, 2005. 
Further, outside of the record but lodged with the Court, Mr. Bishop requested the Court 
take judicial notice of the Sentencing Memorandum submitted by Mr. Richard Harris on 
August 5, 2005; the Change of Plea held on June 9, 2005 and the transcript of the 
same, specifically page nine (9) line twenty (20) through page ten (10) line twenty four 
(24) and the Sentencing transcript from August 11,2005. 
The Court determined that Mr. Stringfield had no objection and would stipulate to 
the documents as listed by Mr. Harris. Further, the State did not have any other 
documents for the Court to take judicial review of other than the documents as 
previously requested in the November 16, 2007 filing. The Court determined neither of 
counsel had opening statements to present. 
COURT '\ ]~~I.;T'=:~ 
APRIL 1?, ~f"l 
:Ja~c 2 
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The petitioner's first witness, JULIE A. TURNER, was called, sworn by the clerk 
and direct examined. Petitioner's Exhibit #1 having been previously marked was 
identified as a "Memo" regarding Trevor Booth and punishment for murder. Direct 
examination continued. The witness was cross-examined and re-direct examined. 
The petitioner's second witness, JOHN TURNER, was called, sworn by the clerk 
and direct examined. Counsel stipulated to the admission of Petitioner's Exhibit #1. 
Direct examination continued. The witness was cross-examined and re-direct 
examined. Mr. Bishop made reference to and reviewed specific documents that the 
Court had taken judicial review of. 
The Court advised the parties it would take a brief recess and the Court recessed 
at 10:25 a.m. 
Court reconvened at 10:40 a.m. with all parties present. 
The petitioner's third witness, JENNIFER LYNN BOOTH, was called, sworn by 
the clerk, direct examined, cross-examined and re-direct examined. 
The petitioner's fourth witness, MARK BENJAMIN BOOTH, was called, sworn 
by the clerk, direct examined, cross-examined and re-direct examined. 
The petitioner's fifth witness, TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, was called, sworn by 
the clerk, direct examined, cross examined, re-direct examined and re-cross examined. 
The petitioner rested. 
COURT MINUTES 
APRIL 13, 2009 
PDge 3 
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The Court addressed counsel, determined it would break for lunch and instructed 
the parties to be prepared to reconvene at 1 :00 p.m. 
The Court recessed at 11 :51 a.m. 
Court reconvened at 1 :11 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Stringfield requested the Court take judicial notice of the Rule 11 plea 
agreement document. 
The Court noted for the record that it would take judicial review of the Rule 11 
plea agreement from case number CR2005-01658*C. 
The respondent's first witness, RICHARD HARRIS, was called and sworn by the 
clerk. 
Mr. Stringfield presented statements to the Court indicating that Mr. Harris had 
concerns with his testimony relating to attorney-client privilege. However, under the 
Rules of Evidence the State's position was that the defendant was waiving that privilege 
due to him challenging Mr. Harris's representation. Further, Mr. Harris would like an 
Order from the Court regarding the same. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Bishop indicated he had no position on the 
matter. 
The Court clarified that the defendant would normally have that right, however ' 
Ordered that in this instance regarding post convictio~ relief issues and the defendant 
challenging the representation of counsel, the Cittorney-client privilege was waived. 
COURT MINUTES 
APRIL 13, 2009 
Page 1 
000074 
The witness was direct examined and cross-examined. Mr. Bishop requested 
time to allow the witness to review Petitioner's Exhibit #1. 
The Court recessed at 2:12 p.m. 
Court reconvened at 2:20 p.m. with all parties present. 
Cross-examination continued. The witness was re-direct examined and excused 
by the Court. 
The witness presented statements to the Court regarding his opinion on the 
sentencing in this matter. 
The Court recessed at 2:59 p.m. 
Court reconvened at 4:08 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Stringfield requested the Court take judicial notice of a specific document, 
that being. the Defendant's Response to Request for Discovery filed in CR2005-
01658*C. 
Mr. Bishop advised the Court that was one of the documents he had requested 
the Court take judicial notice of. earlier in this hearing. 
Mr. Stringfield indicated the specifics of the document he was requesting the 
Court take judicial notice of. 
The Court so noted. 
The respondent's second witness, GEARLD WOLFF. was called, sworn bv the 
clerk, direct examined, cross-examined and re-direct examined. 
COURT MINUT€:S 
APRiL 13, 2009 
P3a'~) 5 
000075 
The respondent rested. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding closing arguments. 
Mr. Bishop indicated he would prefer to do written closing argument. 
The Court expressed opinions and addressed counsel regarding setting the 
matter over to hear closing argument, however would stiJI expect counsel to brief the 
law. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Stringfield advised the Court however it 
wished to proceed would be fine. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding its usual process in this type of ruling. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Stringfield indicated that if the Court desired 
written closing argument, then he would request a transcript of this hearing. 
The Court noted for the record that the transcript was approximately two hundred 
and seven (207) pages. 
Mr. Stringfield presented statements to the Court and advised he would prefer to 
have a transcript of this hearing and present oral closing argument. 
Mr. Bishop presented statements to the Court regarding the defendant's custody 
status, requested he be returned to the penitentiary at this time and then brought back 
at a later date for closing arguments. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding their briefs and any other issues of law 
~here may be in addition to the standard ones. 
COUFT MINUTES 
APh,i.. i ::>, 20C3 
Mr. Bishop presented statements to the Court regarding primary issues of law 
and the specifics therein. 
The Court expressed opinions regarding factual findings in this matter. 
Mr. Bishop presented statements to the Court regarding the Memorandum exhibit 
in this matter. 
The Court determined the parties wanted additional time to prepare closing 
arguments and that preparation of the transcript in this matter would be appropriate. 
Therefore the Court would authorize and Order the transcript to be prepared and paid 
for at county expense. 
Counsel concurred. 
The Court directed the parties to prepare written arguments to be submitted 
along with proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Further the Court 
instructed counsel how to proceed regarding the format of their filings in the event they 
felt that any of the facts needed to be argued. The Court advised that if any additional 
briefing was needed, counsel could submit supporting Briefs on key issues. The Court 
further advised the parties that the Court may issue a written ruling or may set the 
matter for an oral ruling on the record. 
The Court instructed Mr. Stringfield to submit a proposed Order regarding the 
transcript. The Court addressed counsel regarding time limits and Ordered the parties 





26, 2009. Further the Court would then follow up with a written ruling or set the matter 
for an oral ruling. 
Counsel indicated they understood. 
The Court thanked the parties for their participation in the hearing this date and 
Court adjourned at 5:17 p.m. 
C<JURT MINUTES 
n.r=<i.lL 13, 2000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: AUGUST 26,2009 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













CASE NO: CV-2006-8651-C 
TIME: 11 :00 A.M. 
REPORTED BY: LAURA WHITING 
DCRT1 (11 :00 - 11 :08) 
-------------) 
This having been the time heretofore set for status/scheduling conference in 
the above-entitled matter, the petitioner was not present in court but was represented by 
counsel, Mr. Van Bishop; and the respondent was represented by Mr. Ty Ketlinski. 
The Court called the case, noted the parties present, and reviewed prior 
proceedings. 
The Court noted that Mr. Stringfield was no longer with the prosecutors office, 
that being the reason for the delay. Further, the Court noted that new counsel had been 
assigned. The Court noted that Mr. Bishop contacted the Court's secretary, indicating 
his Brief was complete. The Court further indicated it had requested all Briefs be filed 
at the same time. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 26, 2009 Page 1 
000079 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Ketlinski advised that Mr. Stringfield should 
have filed a Brief on May 26th . 
Mr. Bishop advised the Court that May 26th was the initial date for the Brief, 
noting that he would be late with his brief. Mr. Bishop further noted that he completed 
his brief on or around June 2nd • 
The Court expressed opinions regarding filing brief's, indicating that the later 
filings were legitimate and the state the parties were at was understandable due to Mr. 
Stringfield no longer being with the prosecutors office. The Court further expressed 
opinions regarding post convictions and making a record in the case. 
The Court determined that Mr. Ketlinski would need a couple of weeks to file a 
Brief. 
The Court ordered the petitioner and the respondent to submit their Briefs 
no later than September 14, 2009. Further, the Court ordered the petitioner and 
respondent to submit proposed finding and conclusions of law by September 14, 
2009, requesting that they be submitted in MS Format and a hard copy. 
Counsel indicated they understood and court adjourned. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 26, 2009 
Deputy Clerk 
, .' _r_'_A.~~ 
DEC 0 t 2009 
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CASE NO. CV-06-08651 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER GRANTING 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
The above-entitled cause came before the court on April 13,2009 as a court trial 
on Trevor Booth's petition for Post Conviction Relief. Van G. Bishop appeared as 
counsel for the petitioner, who was also present. Deputy Canyon County Prosecutor Ken 
Stringfield appeared on behalf of the respondent. 
At the conclusion of the evidence phase, the Court directed counsel to submit 
written arguments addressing the legal issues involved in the case, as well as proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the request of counsel, the Court ordered that 
a transcript of the testimony be prepared and provided to both counsel, and scheduled a 
date for simultaneous submission of written arguments and proposed findings. 
At some point prior to the submission of written arguments, counsel for the state 
resigned from the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and the date for filing 
simultaneous briefs was continued to September 14, 2009, to allow new counsel to 
familiarize himself with the record and prepare a written argument and proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




findings.' On October 23,2009, the Court notified respective counsel that based on the 
timing of the filing of their written arguments with the Court's existing caseload and 
schedule, the Court would not be able to review the arguments before November 1,2009, 
and therefore, the matter would be considered under advisement as of that date. After 
consideration of the facts and applicable law, the Court grants the petition. 
Remaining Issues at Trial 
1. Petitioner contends that he was coerced into a guilty plea to First Degree Murder 
because his counsel in the underlying first degree murder case utilized coercive and 
threatening tactics against the petitioner and his family, assuring them that the 
petitioner would receive a ten-year fixed sentence if he were to plead guilty to first 
degree murder, but he would receive a fixed life sentence if he went to trial. 
2. The petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in a 
denial of due process rights. 
Content of the Trial 
Prior to the presentation of evidence, respective counsel stipulated to a request 
that the Court take judicial notice of various documents and records in the Booth's 
underlying criminal case file (No. CR2005-1658), which the Court granted. All of the 
requested records are also included as attachments to the State's Request for Judicial 
Notice, filed on November 16, 2007 (in support of the state's motion for summary 
disposition), that attached extensive records from the underlying criminal file, as well as 
the Clerk's record, transcripts (of the plea and sentencing hearings) and briefs on appeal 
Although there was some initial delay of the submission of the written arguments based on the 
mutual agreement of counsel, Petitioner's counsel was prepared to submit his written argument in July of 
2009, but he was allowed by the Court to delay submission of it until the new counsel for the state was 
prepared to simultaneously submit the state's argument. 
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of that criminal case, under Docket Number 32289. The only exhibit admitted at trial 
was the May 9, 2005 written "memo" to Booth's from his criminal defense attorney, 
Richard Harris. 
The witnesses at trial were Trevor Booth, Julie A. Turner (his mother), John 
Turner (his step-father), Jennifer Lynn Booth (his sister), Mark Benjamin Booth (his 
father), Richard Harris (Booth's attorney in the criminal case), and Gearld Wolff (the 
prosecutor in the criminal case). 
Findings of Fact 
1. On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum was killed from multiple gunshot wounds, 
which occurred at his residence in Caldwell, Idaho. The subsequent police 
investigation led investigators to believe that Trevor Booth was the individual who 
killed Mr. Kellum. The investigation further revealed that the before Kellum died, he 
twice identified Trevor Booth as the person who shot him. The police determined 
that the perpetrator entered the residence through the back door and shot the victim 
five times, utilizing an improvised silencer that had been fashioned out of a plastic 
soda bottle. The police further found a single set of footprints in fresh snow going 
from the back door of the house to the location on the street where a vehicle 
(identified by neighbors as a black pickup) had been parked at the time of the 
shooting. Booth (who owned and drove a black pickup) told investigators that he 
(Booth) drove his pickup truck to Kellum's residence that same morning, parked it on 
the street, and walked to the door of the residence for what he described as a pre-
arranged meeting to pick up marijuana from Kellum for him to sell,2 when he heard 
Booth told investigators that he actively sold controlled substances and that Kellum was his 
supplier. 
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screaming and gunshots, and then he left the residence. 
2. Trevor James Booth was charged on January 18, 2005 with first degree murder in 
Canyon County, Idaho, Criminal Case No. 2005-01568. In that case, Booth was 
represented by attorney Richard L. Harris. The state was represented by Deputy 
Canyon County Prosecutor Gearld L. Wolff. The assigned judge was District Judge 
Gregory M. Culet, who also serves as the presiding judge in this case. 
3. The case was scheduled for jury trial to commence on June 17, 2005, with a pretrial 
conference scheduled for May 6,2005. 
4. During the time the case was pending, Mr. Harris met with Booth periodically, and 
Booth's version of the events, as he related them to Harris, slowly changed from 
initially contending that he did not commit the offense, to eventually acknowledging 
that he actually killed Leonard Kellum, but that he did so because of what Booth 
perceived as self-defense and defense of others. More specifically, Booth informed 
Harris that he was a drug dealer who worked for Kellum, who was his supplier. At 
some point in this relationship with Kellum, Booth fell behind in paying Kellum for 
the drugs that he supplied, and he owned Kellum a considerable amount of money. 
He stated that Kellum began making threats of physical violence to Booth unless he 
came up with the money he owed. At some point in that process, Booth informed 
Kellum that he was going to discontinue dealing for him and move to California to 
obtain employment either with Booth's father or obtained through his father, to which 
Booth reported that Kellum threatened him that if he did not pay his sizable debt 
and/or if he quit dealing drugs for him, Kellum would do harm to Booth's family 
members and/or his girlfriend, who were still living in Idaho. 
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5. During the pendency of the case, at least one witness came forward to the law 
enforcement who stated that on the night before the shooting, the witness observed 
Booth cleaning his handgun, that Booth had recently expressed concern about his 
approximately $10,000 debt to Kellum, of which he had only been able to come with 
$3,000 in partial payment, and that Booth indicated that he would kill Kellum before 
allowing him to do harm to Booth. The witness further informed investigators that 
Booth had also discussed his knowledge of silencers in his presence. Still other 
witnesses indicated to police investigators that Booth was a known drug dealer and 
was known to carry a pistol or keep a shotgun. Further, police found a role of cash 
containing approximately $3,000 at the victim's residence, tending to confirm the 
witness' story. 
6. Harris was aware of all of this information as he was evaluating the case against 
Booth. He went over the discovery with Booth, and as Booth developed an increased 
understanding of the weight of the evidence against him, he began to change his story 
to Harris as what actually occurred. 
7. On April 26, 2005, defense counsel filed a "Motion to Suppress Statement of 
Defendant," seeking to suppress certain statements made by Mr. Booth to law 
enforcement, and the motion was initially scheduled for a suppression hearing at the 
same time as the pretrial conference, May 6,2005. 
8. In the meantime, Deputy Prosecutor Gearld Wolff was engaged in his own case 
preparation, and he concluded that under the recently amended Idaho Code § 18-
4004/ if any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in the recently 
3 Based on the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2484, 
153 L.Ed.2d. 556 (2002), I.C. §18-4004 and §19-2515 were amended in 2003 to provide forjury 
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amended I.C. §19-2515 were found beyond a reasonable doubt at a fact finding stage 
of the trial, the court would be required to impose a fixed life sentence, despite the 
fact that this case was not a capital case. Mr. Wolff informed Booth's attorney, 
Richard Harris, of his view of the statute and of his intent to file a request for the 
Court to provide a special verdict form to the jury in the event that Booth was found 
guilty of first degree murder, which would instruct the jury to determine if certain 
statutory aggravating sentencing circumstances exist, specifically whether the murder 
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, whether the defendant exhibited utter 
disregard for life, or whether the defendant exhibited a propensity to commit murder 
which will continue to be a continuing threat. 
9. Mr. Harris thereafter examined the murder statutes as modified in the 2003 
legislation, and concluded that the Court did have the authority to so instruct the jury 
in the event that the jury found Booth guilty of first degree murder, and Harris further 
concluded that if any of the statutory aggravating circumstances were then found 
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, the Court would be required to sentence Booth 
to a fixed life term. 
10. Wolff and Harris met with the presiding judge in chambers prior to the May 6, 2005 
pretrial conference and suppression hearing, and presented the Court with the issue of 
statutory aggravating circumstances and the state's intent to request the special 
verdict form, and they further discussed Wolffs and Harris' mutual perspective of the 
sentencing in capital murder cases. Among the amendments to the statute was the following provision: "If 
a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence with a 
minimum period of confmement of not less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the 
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, 
except for meritorious service." 2003 Idaho Laws, Ch. 19 (SB 1001). (Emphasis reflects the added 
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law in regard to that issue. The testimony of both Harris and Wolff does not indicate 
that the judge expressed whether he agreed with their legal assessment, but rather, the 
testimony reflects that based on discussion, the judge informed them that in the event 
the special verdict form was requested by the state and supported by the evidence, the 
Court would utilize the special verdict form instructing the jury to determine whether 
the statutory aggravating circumstances had been proven. 
a. However, both counsel believed that if a statutory aggravating factor were 
found beyond a reasonable doubt at a fact finding stage, the Court would have 
to impose a fixed life sentence, and certainly nothing that the judge told them 
in that conference led either counsel to believe that the Court would deviate 
from their expectation. 
11. After the meeting in chambers, the parties went on the record and the pretrial 
conference and the motion to suppress were continued to June 3, 2005. 
12. Based on the May 6th meeting, Mr. Harris prepared a May 9, 2005 "Memo" to Booth 
outlining what he believed the status of the law to be, including the sentencing 
requirements if aggravating circumstances were found. He informed Booth that the 
judge had indicated to both counsel that he would instruct the jury to determine if any 
aggravating circumstances had been proven, and he also informed Booth what he 
believed would happen should there be a jury trial (i.e., that there was a likelihood of 
conviction of first degree murder and a finding by the jury of an aggravating factor, 
resulting in a fixed life sentence), and what he believed would be Booth's likely 
sentence if he pled guilty in the absence of the statutory aggravating circumstances, 
specifically, that he believed, based on his knowledge of the Court, that the likely 
la!l,gUa~1 
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sentence would be ten to fifteen years fixed, followed by indeterminate life 
imprisonment. 
13. Particular sections of the memo reflect the following advice: 
a. The entire text of I.C. § 18-4004 regarding the statutory basis of sentencing for 
murder was set out, followed by: 
What this statute means is that upon a conviction for first degree murder, 
if the jury or a judge if jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt the sentence is death. However, 
if the prosecutor does not seek death, as is the case here, and if a statutory 
aggravating circumstance is found, then the sentence is a fixed life 
sentence. At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge indicated to the 
prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury that 
will ask the question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of 
first degree murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also contain the 
same question for second degree murder and for manslaughter. If the jury 
finds you guilty of first degree murder, the verdict form would contain the 
further question of the jury: "Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt a 
statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or No." Since the trial judge 
intends to submit that question to the jury as part of the verdict form and if 
the jury finds an aggravating circumstance as a part of the verdict, then the 
sentence to be imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the evidence 
there is in mitigation, a fixed life sentence which means you will spend the 
rest of your life in prison. 
b. Thereafter, the memo sets out all the statutory aggravating circumstances 
listed in I.C. §19-2515, or paraphrased versions of them, and identifies the 
three subsections of the statute that Harris believed may apply to Booth's 
case, specifically, sub-sections e - ("the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel"), f - ("by committing the murder the defendant exhibited 
utter disregard for life"), or h - ("the defendant has exhibited a propensity to 
commit murder which will continue to be a continuing threat"). Harris further 
related: 
My experience has been with murder cases that it is not too difficult for 
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finding to be made that the murder is heinous (a murder by definition is 
considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or alternatively that by committing 
the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life. Although it 
might be stretch, by committing one murder, a person has demonstrated 
that he can commit murder especially in the context of a drug related 
transaction. 
The bottom line is this. If you are convicted of first degree murder, not a 
death penalty case, but the jury finds an aggravating circumstance, you 
will spend the rest of you life in prison. I have had some preliminary 
discussions with the prosecutor and they may be willing to waive anything 
to do with an "aggravating circumstance" in return for a plea of guilty to 
the murder of Kellum. 
c. Harris then advised Booth that the sentencing range available to the judge in 
that circumstance was ten years fixed followed by life indeterminate, and he 
further explained how the fixed and indeterminate portions of the sentence 
would be handled by the Board of Corrections, and that Booth would be 
eligible for consideration of parole after serving the fixed time. He further 
advised that the prosecutor could recommend a greater term than ten years, 
and that the 
[t]he judge would not be bound by the fixed term of ten years and could 
impose a greater term than ten years. . . My effort would be to present 
mitigating facts to the judge which would get you the ten number or the 
least number above ten as possible. Knowing the judge as I do, I do not 
think that number would exceed fifteen. 
d. Harris then discussed the existing evidence that could be used against Booth. 
Specifically, Harris explained the victim's repeated dying declaration made to 
law enforcement personnel and to paramedics that Booth shot him, and the 
probable admissibility of the statements at trial. Harris further explained how 
Booth's statements to police were inconsistent in lieu of the physical 
evidence. Harris also explained Booth's plausible motive to murder the 
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victim, that both were involved in drug dealing and Booth owed the victim "a 
lot of money." The substance of this advice is set out on page 3 of the memo: 
What does this mean in terms of decision making? Based upon the 
evidence as currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the 
jury is going to return a verdict of guilty. The evidence is that the shooter 
went into the house through the back door. The door was ajar when the 
police entered the house. The police have statements from Kellurn 
identifying you as the shooter, not just once but he reiterated your identity 
as the shooter at least six times. Those statements of Kellum are 
admissible in evidence as a dying declaration to the hearsay rule. I have 
explained that rule to you previously. The police will be able to use your 
statement that you had gone over to the house, heard arguing and shots 
being fired from in the house even though you stated you did not enter the 
house. However an inference is going to be drawn and the prosecutor will 
argue that (1) the shooter did not enter the house through the front door 
because (a) the door was locked when the police arrived, and (b) there 
were no footprints in the snow leading up to the front door; (2) that when 
the neighbors in the back apartment left that morning no foot prints were 
observed in the snow; (3) that the police will testify that there was only 
one set of footprints leading up to the back door, the same foot prints led 
over to the end of the drive way and back towards the back door, and 
finally the same set of foot prints ostensibly then ran from the backdoor 
across the yard out onto the street; and (4) the footprints match up to your 
shoe. The inference to be drawn from these facts is that you are the 
shooter to the exclusion of anyone else. Otherwise there would have been 
other footprints in the snow and there were none, and you in fact stated 
you were there even though you deny the shooting. If you did not do the 
shooting why did Kellum identify you as being the shooter. While I can 
make argument that there is no evidence you were in the house other than 
Kellum's statement, that the weapon has not been located and the 
argument can be made that the real shooter has it, that is somewhat weak 
in comparison. If the matter goes to trial, you would have to testify as to 
what you have said all along. But testifying means being subject to cross 
examination and having to explain the lack of other peoples footprints in 
the snow, why Kellum identified you and dealing with motive. The motive 
ostensibly being the fact you owed Kellum a lot of money. Although it 
could be argued other people may have had motive to kill Kellum, 
particularly because of his acts and conduct and being heavily involved in 
drug dealing, there is no hard evidence that implicates anyone else. 
e. Harris concluded his memo with the following advice: 
The bottom line is this. If you go to trial, there is the very strong 
probability of facing a fixed life sentence. That means spending the rest of 
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your life in prison. If you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor 
waiving aggravated circumstances, or not requesting the court to consider 
aggravating circumstances, then you would face a minimum period of 
incarceration of ten. years or whatever greater period the judge might 
impose. I have indicated above I do not think the judge would impose a 
term greater than fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in 
that context means thirty years. My recommendation is because of the 
strong risk of spending the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement 
may be your best option. Please consider and let me know as soon as 
possible. 
14. In summary, Mr. Harris articulated in the memo what he saw as the salient facts in the 
case and the likelihood of the prosecution being able to prove those facts. He further 
articulated the law that he believed to be applicable to the case, which included his 
opinion that the judge would be required to sentence him to fixed life if certain 
findings were made. His memo appears to be a carefully drafted document that 
conveyed to Booth what his current position was in the case, both legally and 
factually, and in which he made a recommendation that Booth avoid a trial and the 
risk of what Harris perceived would be a fixed life sentence. Nothing in the memo 
reflects that. Harris threatened Booth into pleading guilty. Rather, the document 
appears to explain to Booth what his options were at the time. While none of the 
options offered any "safe harbor" for Booth, Harris did opine to him what was, in his 
view, essentially the least detrimental alternative, and that was to plead guilty and 
present mitigation at sentencing. 
a. Harris' opinion that the most Booth would receive from the sentencing judge 
with regard to the ten to fifteen year fixed portion of his sentence was based 
on articulated factors, such as the comparative sentences in similar cases in 
Canyon County, his knowledge and experience with the judge, and the 
additional factors in Booth's case that he felt were significant mitigating 
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factors, such as Booth's age, lack of significant criminal record, the unsavory 
background of the victim, and the fact that Booth was under the influence of 
drugs. However, as Harris' memo to Booth reflects, Harris advised him that 
the prosecutor was not prohibited from recommending a fixed term greater 
than ten years, and the judge was free to sentence Booth to a fixed term 
greater than ten years, but that Harris would attempt to limit that prospect by 
presenting what he deemed to be considerable mitigating evidence. 
15. The issue of whether Harris' legal analysis of Idaho murder statutes was legally 
sound when he advised Booth regarding the consequences of the jury finding any of 
the statutory aggravating circumstances will be addressed in the Court's Conclusions 
of Law portion of this decision. 
16. On May 18, 2005, the state filed a "Motion for Use of Special Verdict Form," 
requesting that in the event the jury found Booth guilty of first degree murder, the 
Court further direct the jury to answer a special verdict form pursuant to I.C. § 18-
4004. 
a. Specifically, the proposed verdict form directed the jury to determine 1) 
whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) whether the 
defendant exhibited utter disregard for life, or 3) whether the defendant 
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will continue to be a 
continuing threat. The prosecution believed that the special verdict form 
complied with Idaho Code § 18-4004, under which the prosecution contended 
that if the jury found one of the listed statutory aggravating circumstances, the 
Court would be required to impose a fixed life sentence. This motion was 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12 
000092 
also noticed up for hearing on June 3,2005, at the same time as the continued 
suppression hearing and pretrial conference. 
17. The state did not seek the death penalty and did not file a Written Notice of Intent to 
Seek the Death Penalty. Although the state did not file a specific statement of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances they intended to rely on, it was apparent from the 
circumstances set out in their motion for special verdict form what the statutory 
circumstances were that the state intended to pursue. 
18. After Booth received Harris' memorandum, negotiations continued between the 
prosecution and the defense. Harris went over the memorandum with Booth's family 
members and continued to meet with them, including his mother, father and sister, 
and he discussed with them the nuances of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
and what the risks were of going to trial on the merits of the case. 
19. On June 3, 2005, Booth and Harris both signed and executed a written plea 
agreement, which was also sign by Prosecutor Wolff on June 9, 2005. The document 
was entitled "Conditional Plea of Guilty Pursuant to 1.C.R. I I (d)(3) and (4) Binding 
Plea Agreement," in which the state agreed not to pursue statutory aggravating 
circumstances as defined in 1. C. § 18-4004 in exchange for Booth's guilty plea to first 
degree murder. In the agreement, Booth specifically attested that his decision to 
plead guilty to first degree murder was "freely and voluntarily made," and that he was 
not "induced to conditionally plead guilty by any force, coercion, pressure, or fear." 
Additionally, Booth attested that he understood that the sentencing range was a 
minimum fixed term of ten years up to life, and the "sentence to be imposed is 
reserved to the sound discretion of the Court." 
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20. The Rule 11 agreement was filed with the Court on June 9, 2005, at which time Booth 
appeared with his attorney Harris and the plea agreement was presented on the record. 
In the course of presenting the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Harris acknowledged 
that the Court was going to issue a life sentence, but the actual length of the fixed 
portion of that sentence was open for argument by both sides at sentencing. He noted 
that the Court was not bound by any particular fixed portion of a prison term, but 
noted that historically in Canyon County, the fixed portions of first degree murder 
sentences for similar cases in which the Court had sentencing discretion, were 
typically from 10 to 25 years, and that Mr. Wolff (who was not present at that 
hearing) had indicted that his recommendation for a fixed term was likely to be 
somewhere within those same parameters, but that Wolff was not binding himself to 
any particular commitment. Deputy Prosecutor Chris Topmiller, who was appearing 
for the state at the plea hearing, specifically emphasized, "Judge, yes, but one thing. 
You could still impose fixed life if you saw fit." 
21. The Court then examined Booth regarding his plea of guilty, during which Booth told 
the Court that he had sufficient time to discuss this case with his attorney; that he was 
20 years old and had graduated from high school; that he was not on any medication 
and had not had any alcoholic beverage or drugs within 24 hours; that other than the 
plea agreement that was presented in court, no one had said or done anything else to 
force him to plead guilty; that no suggested to him that just because he plead guilty 
the court would be lenient with him; that as long as the Court sentenced within the 
parameters of the Rule 11 agreement, the Court was not bound by the 
recommendations of counsel on either side; that by pleading guilty he gave up his 
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right to a jury trial, right against self-incrimination, presumption of innocence, right 
to be confronted by witnesses and to cross-examine them and call witness in defense 
of the charge (other than presentation of mitigation evidence at sentencing); that he 
waived the right to challenge any confessions or admissions made by him to the 
police or any searches or seizures made by the police; that in the event he received 
any new felony charges, this conviction could be used against him as part of an 
allegation of being a persistent violator of the law, potentially subjecting him to 
greater penalties than would normally be available for that later charge; that once the 
Court accepted his guilty plea, as long as the Court sentenced within the parameters 
of the plea agreement he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea; and 
finally, that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because he did, in fact, 
commit the offense. 
22. Finally, before taking the actual plea of guilty from Booth, the Court read the 
language in the charging information, which included each element of first degree 
murder, to which Booth entered a guilty plea to the charge of first degree murder and 
the Court accepted the plea. 
23. Booth alleges that Harris was not prepared for trial based, In part, on Harris' 
discussions with him regarding the case. 
a. Most of Booth's evidence in this regard is based on his own testimony, and 
involved allegations that Harris had called him the by the victim's name at 
some point and otherwise gave him the impression that he was not familiar 
with the case. 
b. Harris interviewed between twelve to twentyfive potential witnesses, and even 
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filed a motion to compel against the state to obtain as much discovery as 
possible. 
c. He also interviewed witnesses whose names had been provided to him by 
Booth, but determined that those witnesses' knowledge of events relevant to 
Booth's defense were based on what Booth himself had told them, and not 
from their own personal knowledge. 
d. Another witness identified as Tim (apparently this is Tim Rainbolt, who was 
eventually listed as a state witness in discovery) had contacted Harris and 
wished to talk to him about the case. The information he provided to Harris 
was that he was a friend of Booth who had contact with him a day or two 
before Kellum was killed. He told Harris that Booth had told him that Kellum 
had made threats against him and that Booth stated that he was going to "take 
care of it." Tim further related that subsequent to Kellum's death, Booth 
made statements to him to the effect that he "had taken care of it." Harris 
informed the witness that it was essentially up to him if wished to talk to the 
police. 
e. In another allegation, Booth claims that Harris should have hired a forensic 
expert. However, Harris testified that he saw little benefit to be obtained from 
that expenditure under the circumstances of this case. When the evidence 
began stacking up against Booth as it was supplied through the state's 
discovery and Harris' investigation, as well as Booth's own revelations to 
Harris, it appears that Harris was utilizing his considerable experience in 
criminal law (he has tried over 250 felony trials) to expend his energies and 
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his client's family members' money on what he perceived to be the most 
realistic approach to the case. As previously noted, and contrary to Booth's 
testimony at the trial in the post conviction relief case, Harris discussed with 
Booth the considerable evidence that he obtained in discovery, which is one of 
the factors that caused Booth to change his story to Harris as to what actually 
happened. Harris explained to Booth and some of his family members what 
he saw as the realistic circumstances facing Booth in the case, and what 
Booth's options were, and he provided Booth time to determine how he 
wanted to proceed. 
24. Mr. Harris' testified that while there was evidence to support a lesser included offense 
of second degree murder, there was also significant evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation in the commission of the offense that would be sufficient to support a 
conviction of first degree murder. Conversely, his review of the evidence caused him 
to conclude that this was not a viable case to receive a verdict of the lesser offense of 
manslaughter, as there was no evidence that the killing occurred in the heat of passion 
in a sudden quarrel. 
25. Harris's testimony is credible and believable that Booth did not provide him with any 
evidence that would satisfy the elements of the lesser offense of manslaughter, and 
that Booth did not tell him he wanted to pursue manslaughter as a defense, nor was 
manslaughter pursued as a defense by Booth's family. 
26. Had the case proceeded to trial, Harris was prepared to pursue a defense of a lesser 
included offense of second degree murder and, despite the lack of evidence 
supporting a lesser offense of manslaughter, he hoped that he may even have gotten 
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headway with juror "nullification" resulting in manslaughter because of the unsavory 
behavior of the victim as a drug dealer who threatened the safety of Booth, his family, 
and his girlfriend. However, as Harris' memo to Booth reflects, there was a 
significant amount of evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that existed against 
Booth. 
27. Thus, the evidence reflects that two of the significant reasons Booth pled guilty to 
first degree murder was the reasonable expectation that the State would have a strong 
case against him for first degree murder, and that if he pled guilty, there was a 
reasonable opportunity to receive a life sentence with only a ten to fifteen-year fixed 
term based on case specific mitigating factors. All of this was based on the 
reasonable advice of his legal counsel. 
28. However, another significant reason that Booth pled guilty to first degree murder was 
that he believed, based on the advice of legal counsel, that if he went to trial and was 
found guilty with at least one of the statutory aggravators also being found, the Court 
would be prohibited from weighing any mitigating factors and was bound to issue a 
mandatory fixed life sentence. 
29. Although Trevor Booth's testimony in the PCR case lacked a significant level of 
credibility, Richard Harris' testimony was virtually unimpeachable. His testimony 
establishes that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his opinion and advice 
that I.C. §18-4004 provides for a mandatory fixed life sentence in a non-capital first 
degree murder case if a statutory aggravating circumstance is proven, the defendant 
would not have pled guilty and would have either insisted on going to trial and/or 
continued to pursue some other plea agreement. 
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30. At the August 11, 2005 sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested an 
indeterminate life sentence, with forty years fixed. The defense argued for an 
indeterminate life sentence, but with ten years (or close thereto) fixed. 
31. Booth was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence, with thirty years fixed. The 
transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the Court considered and weighed the 
mitigating factors that were presented in favor of a lighter sentence, but that the 
overall behavior of Booth himself, as a full time drug dealer who was actively 
engaged in illegal business dealings with another drug dealer/supplier, and who 
resorted to premeditated murder to resolve either an actual or perceived threat from 
his supplier, also weighed heavily in the Court's sentencing decision. 
32. Booth timely appealed his conviction and sentence, but his appeal was denied. 
Thereafter, his Petition for Post Conviction Relief was timely filed. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Idaho Code § 19-490 1 provides the remedy of post conviction relief to a criminal 
defendant who has been convicted and sentenced for a crime. It provides in relevant 
part: 
(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy: may 
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure 
relief. 
(b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. 
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited 
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and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it 
comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other 
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity ofthe conviction or 
sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. 
2. An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. 
The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the truth of the 
allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Pecone v. 
State, 135 Idaho 865, 26 P.3d 48 (Ct. App. 2001); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 
684,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). 
ICR 57. 
3. The two (2) issues Booth presented relate to (1) whether or not he was gIven 
competent advice by his attorney when pleading guilty, and (2) whether his guilty 
plea was voluntary, and not coerced. 
4. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated 
a two part-test that a defendant must meet in order to obtain post-conviction relief 
based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must 
prove that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. (Id. at 688) Second, if the reviewing court finds the defendant can 
prove that counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective, then the defendant 
must prove that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 
5. Whether an attorney's pretrial preparation falls below a level of reasonable 
performance constitutes a question of law but is essentially premised upon the 
circumstances surrounding the attorney's investigation. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401 
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(Ct.App.1989). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents mixed issues of 
fact and law. Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
6. An attorney has duty to reasonably investigate or make a reasonable decision that 
particular investigations are unnecessary. Wade v. Claderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th 
Cir.1994). 
7. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wade v. Calderon, 
29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. See also, Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
8. That counsel could have conducted a more thorough investigation that might have 
borne fruit does not establish ineffectiveness. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 
(1987). 
9. Petitioner must establish that counsel was put on notice to investigate a particular 
matter. Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181 (9thCir.l995). Petitioner must allege that he 
informed the attorney or that the attorney knew of facts warranting investigation. 
Langfordv. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1387 (9thCir.l997). 
10. "We recognize that a defendant's lawyer does not always have a duty to consult 
experts when the government is proposing to put on expert witnesses. 'There may be 
no reason to question the validity of the government's proposed evidence or the 
evidence may be so weak that it can be demolished on cross-examination. '" Murphy 
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v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145-46, 139 P.3d 741, 747-48 (Ct. App. 2006); (Citing 
Miller v. Anderson, 255 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir.2001)). 
11. The decision of whether and how to cross examine a witness, whether to call 
character witnesses, how and whether to conduct a particular investigation, whether 
to call any particular witness, the choice of voir dire questions, the choice of 
witnesses, and whether or not to make specific objections, is a strategic decision and 
should not be second guessed unless it is made upon the basis of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other objective shortcomings. Cunningham 
v. State, 117 Idaho 428 (Ct.App.l990); Davis, supra at 407; Aragon, supra at 763; 
State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466 (Ct.App.l991); State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231 
(1981); Milton, supra at 640; and Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254 (Ct.App.l994). 
(Emphasis added). 
12. "Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance-that is, 
'sound trial strategy.'" Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (Citing Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 
(Ct.App.1990)). 
13. Apart from the Issue of Mr. Harris' advising Booth that if the jury found an 
aggravating circumstance he would receive a mandatory fixed life sentence (which 
will be addressed below), Booth has not proven that Harris' performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. It is clear that Harris carefully evaluated the 
evidence against Booth as well as the admissible exculpatory evidence, and 
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reasonably advised him regarding the likelihood of a guilty verdict if he were to go to 
trial. His investigation appears to have been diligent, competent and thorough, 
including his decision that not to pursue any further forensic tests. Further, he 
appears to have considered the futility of pursuing defenses that were not supported 
by the evidence and which would have needlessly wasted Booth's family's financial 
resources. 
14. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court applied Strickland, supra, 
to convictions resulting from a guilty plea as opposed to a trial. The Hill court 
reformulated Strickland's second prong, the "prejudice" prong, to require a showing 
by the defendant "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." When 
read together, these two decisions mean that in order for the reviewing court to vacate 
the prior conviction it must find that: (1) defense counsel's performance fell below 
that of an ordinary fallible attorney; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for his attorney's error(s), the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial. 
15. "In order to show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel that led to the 
entering of a plea, the defendant must establish through objective evidence a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's advice, he would not have accepted the 
plea." McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996). 
16. Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of 
the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency 
should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently 
present imponderable questions for which there, are no certain answers; judgments 
may be made that in the light of later events seem improvident, although they were 
perfectly sensible at the time. The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be 
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valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not 
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not 
entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been 
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely 
penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent 
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, cf. Von Mottke v. 
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948), a voluntary plea of guilty 
intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become 
vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty 
premise. A plea of guilty triggered by the expectations of a competently 
counseled defendant that the State will have a strong case against him is not 
subject to later attack because the defendant's lawyer correctly advised him with 
respect to the then existing law as to possible penalties but later pronouncements 
of the courts, as in this case, hold that the maximum penalty for the crime in 
question was less than was reasonably assumed at the time the plea was entered. 
Brady v. Us., 397 U.S. 742, 756-757, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1473, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). 
(Emphasis added). 
17. Idaho Code § 18-4004 provides the punishment for murder and is unchanged from the 
time of Kellum's muder: 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. 
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, 
the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement 
of not less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the 
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of 
sentence for good conduct, except for meritorious service. Every person guilty 
of murder of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten 
(10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life. (Emphasis added). 
18. It is clear that both the prosecutor and defense counsel in Booth's criminal case 
possessed extensive experience in the field of criminal law. Further, it is clear that 
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both counsel shared the view that under the applicable Idaho law in existence at the 
time, Booth would have been subject to a mandatory fixed life term if the jury found 
him guilty of first degree murder and also found that one of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances existed. However, Idaho Code § 18-4004 very distinctly provided at 
that time, as it does now, "if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose 
a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) 
years during which period of confinement the offender shall not be eligible for parole 
or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, except for 
meritorious service." (Emphasis added). 
A. It is clear under the statute that if Booth's case had gone to trial and the Court 
instructed the jury to decide whether any of the aggravating circumstances had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, such a finding of an aggravating 
circumstance would merely have been advisory in nature and the Court would not 
have been mandated to sentence Booth to a fixed life term, but would actually 
have been bound only to sentence within the parameters of a life sentence, with 
any fixed portion above ten years to be entirely within the discretion of the Court. 
19. Of particular note in this case, is that the state presented no legal argument on 
this issue in its written brief or in its proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. It appears that the state concedes the issue that Harris' advice to Booth was 
contrary to the relevant law in effect at the time when he advised Booth, "if the jury 
finds an aggravating circumstance as a part of the verdict, then the sentence to be 
imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the evidence there is in mitigation, a fixed 
life sentence which means you will spend the rest of your life in prison." 
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20. Thus, the Court concludes that only in this limited area of advice to his client, 
Mr. Harris' representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. 
21. The issue then turns to the second prong of the Strickland test, that is, was there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for Mr. Harris advising Booth that he would risked a 
mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to trial and was convicted of first degree 
murder and a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial? 
A. As reflected in the Court's Findings of Fact, the evidence reflects that two of the 
significant reasons Booth pled guilty to first degree murder was the reasonable 
expectation that the State would have a strong case against him for first degree 
murder, and that if he pled guilty there was a reasonable opportunity to receive a 
life sentence with only a ten to fifteen-year fixed term based on case specific 
mitigating factors. All of which was based on the reasonable advise of his legal 
counsel and not subject to post conviction relief. 
22. However, this Court's Findings of Fact also reflect that another significant reason that 
Booth pled guilty to first degree murder is that he believed, based on the advice of 
legal counsel, that if he went to trial and was found guilty of first degree murder and 
at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances, the Court would be prohibited 
from weighing any mitigating factors and was bound to issue a mandatory fixed life 
sentence. This advice loomed significantly in the Rule 11 plea agreement and was 
based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. 
A. This Court had hoped that the state would have presented an argument in the post 
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conviction proceeding regarding this significant issue,4 but in the absence of any 
authority to the contrary, it cannot be said that the legal landscape has changed 
regarding the application of mandatory sentencing in a non-capital case. A 
mandatory fixed life sentence for first degree murder under I.e. § 18-4004, with 
no discretion afforded the Court, is only available when death has been timely 
sought by the state, which was not done in Booth's criminal case. 
23. In fairness to both counsel in the criminal case, this Court could have, and with the 
benefit of hindsight, should have injected an inquiry to clarify the status of that legal 
issue before accepting the plea of guilty. Certainly, such an inquiry and 
determination would have to have been addressed further by the Court and counsel in 
the criminal case if it had actually gone to trial and the jury found any of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances that had been requested by the state had been proved. 
4 It is not lost on the Court that, at the time of Booth's criminal case, the sentencing provisions of 
Idaho's murder statute had recently been amended to conform with the landmark U.S. Supreme Court 
case of Ring v. Arizona, supra, and that, at that time, there was virtually no case law in Idaho (or likely, 
anywhere) addressing the legality of the view of both counsel to the criminal case regarding the 
application of the aggravating circumstances provision of I.C. § 18-4004, or a similar statute in another 
jurisdiction, on a non-capital case. At this point, nothing has been argued on that point and it cannot be 
said that the legal landscape has changed with regard to the non-availability of a statutorily mandated 
fixed life sentence in a non-capital murder case. 
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Accordingly, Trevor Booth's Petition for Post Conviction Relief is granted. His 
sentence is to be rescinded and his guilty plea is allowed to be withdrawn, and his 
criminal case will be scheduled for a status/scheduling conference and thereafter reset for 
jury trial. Petitioner's counsel is directed to prepare an order consistent with this 
decision. 
f)~(fnt hPiI' 
day o~~, 2009, 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
v TRUJILLO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR BOOTH, CASE NO. CV2006-8651 
Petitioner, 
v. MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Respondent, State ofIdaho, by and through its attorney of record, Ty A. Ketlinski of the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, hereby files this Motion to Reconsider regarding 
the Court's December 1,2009 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 11 (b )(2) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 





The Court granted Booth's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief exclusively because 
Booth's trial lawyer, Dick Harris, fell below the objective standard of reasonableness in advising 
his client about pleading guilty. Specifically, the Court found that Harris incorrectly advised 
Booth that he would receive a fixed life sentence ifhe went to trial and the jury found him guilty 
with aggravated circumstances. 
The Court relied heavily on the absence of the State's argument in this regard.! The 
Court inferred that the State conceded this point to Booth. However, the State has not conceded 
this issue and objects to the Court's inference in this regard? The State now requests the Court 
to consider the following argument on the issue. 
The State believes that language of Idaho Code § 18-4004A is patently clear: a fixed-life 
sentence is required when aggravated circumstances are found in a non-capital case, and that 
Harris correctly advised his client in this regard. Even if Harris' advice was ultimately wrong on 
this point, he acted reasonably under the circumstances. Finally, Booth failed to present any 
evidence satisfying the second-prong of the Strickland test. The evidence Booth presented at 
trial did not support his theory that he would have been acquitted, receive a lesser-included 
offense, or ultimately receive a lighter sentence from the Court. 
1 The Court stated that the State's lack of argument in this regard was "[0 ]fparticular note," and 
was written in bold typeface. 
2 The reason for the State's lack of argument in this regard is not germane to this motion. 
However, undersigned counsel understood the language ofIdaho Code § 18-4004 to be self-
evident and an argument in its regard unnecessary, particularly when Booth failed to show the 
second-prong of the Strickland test. 





A. IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 REQUIRES A FIXED-LIFE SENTENCE WHEN A 
JURY FINDS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN A NON-CAPITAL 
CASE. 
If Harris' statutory interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-4004 is correct, then the Court 
cannot find that his representation fell below the 0 bj ective standard of reasonableness. Using the 
rules of statutory construction, it is clear that Idaho Code § 18-4004 requires a fixed-life sentence 
in non-capital cases upon a finding of guilt with aggravated circumstances. 
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear, and 
unambiguous, a court is constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add to the statute 
nor take away by judicial construction. Poison Creek Pub., Inc. v. Central Idaho Pub., Inc., 134 
Idaho 426, 429 (Ct. App. 2000). Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of 
the literal words of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 822 (1992). Unless the 
result is palpably absurd, a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in 
the statute. Id. The court must give the words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, and there 
is no occasion for construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous. Sherwood v. 
Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254 (1991). A court furthermore must give every word, clause and 
sentence effect, if possible. In re Permit No. 36-7200. 121 Idaho at 822. 
In its entirety, Idaho Code § 18-4004 states: 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. 




If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the 
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not 
less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not 
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct, except for meritorious service. Every person guilty of murder of the 
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life. 
This statute contains four (4) sentences. Each sentence will be analyzed separately and 
interpreted in unison with the other sentences. 
1. "Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless 
the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death penalty as 
required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and provided further 
that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall impose a sentence. " 
This provision provides that a sentence for 1 st degree murder must be punished by death 
or life in prison. However, in order for a sentence of death to be imposed, the prosecutor must 
file written notice. If the death penalty is not sought, then the court shall impose a sentence. 
2. "If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition of the death penalty would be 
unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. " 
This provision provides that in the event a jury or judge finds aggravating circumstances 
are present but that the death penalty is unjust, then the court must impose fixed life. 
3. "If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the 
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less 
than ten (lO) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not be 
eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, 
except for meritorious service. " 
This sentence presents the crux issue of this case. The Court only considered the second 
half of this sentence beginning with "if the death penalty is not sought." (See Findings of Fact 




and Conclusions of Law, p. 25.) However, when reading the sentence from its beginning, the 
conjunctive "or" becomes crucial to the meaning ofthe statute. Breaking down this sentence, the 
meaning becomes clear. 
If a jury [ ] does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt 
or 
if the death penalty is not sought, 
[the court shall impose 10 to life]. 
(Emphasis and brackets added.) Thus, a sentence for ten (10) years to life is only permissible 
when the jury does not find aggravating circumstances or the death penalty is not sought. The 
Court and Booth (through his attorney) appear to use the conjunctive "and" instead of "or" in 
construing the meaning of this statute, which incorrectly means that fixed-life is only required 
when the death penalty is sought. Using the conjunctive "or," the meaning of the statute clearly 
means that the Court only has discretion to sentence Booth to 1 0 years fixed to life when either 
an aggravator is not found or if the death penalty is not sought. 
There was no question in this case that the State intended on going forward on 
aggravating circumstances without a request for the death penalty. On May 18, 2005, Prosecutor 
Gearld Wolff filed a Motion for Use of Special Verdict Form. The verdict form asked the jury to 
make a finding of aggravated circumstances. In chambers, this Court indicated that it was 
tending to support the submission of the special verdict form to the jury. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1; 
Tr., p. 192,11. 1-14; Tr., p. 206, 11. 10-19.) 
Both Wolff and Harris interpreted the statute to mean that a finding of an aggravating 
factor meant fixed-life based on the plain meaning of the language of the statute. (Tr., p. 221, 11. 




22-24; p. 169,11. 16-17.) The Court, however, stated in its opinion that ajury finding of 
aggravating circumstances "would have been merely advisory in nature" and the Court was only 
constrained to 10 years to life. The authority for this proposition is unknown, particularly in lieu 
of the plain language of the statute. 
Yet, it appears that Harris' and Wolff s interpretation of the third sentence of the statute 
is congruent with the other sentences. Clearly, the statute was intended to mandate fixed-life in 
any first degree murder case in which an aggravator is found. For example, in the second 
sentence, a fixed-life sentence is required when an aggravator is found but the jury or court finds 
the death penalty unjust. This sentence means that any finding of an aggravator in a death 
penalty case results in a minimum of a fixed-life sentence. The third sentence extends this 
meaning to cases where an aggravator is found but the death penalty is not sought by the 
prosecution. 
In summary, the third sentence in Idaho Code § 18-4004 means that 10 year to life is the 
appropriate sentencing range only when aggravating circumstances are not found or the death 
penalty is not sought. 
4. "Every person guilty o/murder o/the second degree is punishable by imprisonment 
not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life. " 
This sentence provides the penalty for second degree murder. 
In conclusion, Harris correctly advised Booth that if he went to trial and the jury found 
aggravating circumstances, he was facing a mandatory fixed-life sentence. The plain, ordinary 
meaning of the statute requires a fixed-life sentence. 
B. HARRIS WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE WHEN ADVISING HIS 
CLIENT ON A MANDATORY FIXED-LIFE SENTENCE IF BOOTH WAS 
FOUND GUILTY OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 




Finally, even if Harris interpretation of the statute is ultimately incorrect, he nevertheless 
acted objectively reasonable under the circumstances. First, Harris cannot be judged 
unreasonable in his representation of Booth when it is objectively reasonable for attorneys to 
have differing opinions on interpreting a statute. Both Harris and Wolff shared the same 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-4004: a fmding of an aggravating factor meant fixed-life for 
Booth. (Tr., p. 221, 11. 22-24; p. 169,11. 16-17.) Pursuant to the it's Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court disagrees with this interpretation. 
Second, as a noted by the Court, Harris has extensive experience in criminal law. In his 
experience and legal judgment, if the jury came back with a verdict of first degree murder then 
an aggravating circumstance would probably be found. (Tr., p. 171,11.4-10.) Harris stated that 
he thought that a jury finding of the lesser included offense of manslaughter or second degree 
murder was also unlikely. (Tr., p. 137,11.13-20.) Given his judgment of the merits of the 
defense, he presented Booth with pleading guilty and removing the threat of an aggravating 
factor, or going to trial and risking a fixed-life sentence. 
Given that Harris held a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and given that his 
analysis of the facts of the case were sound, his legal counsel to Booth was reasonable under the 
circumstances. This is true even if his ultimate interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-4004 was 
incorrect. 
C. BOOTH FAILED TO SHOW SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE RESULT 
OF HIS CRIMINAL CASE WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT BUT FOR 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court did not find any facts 
indicating that Booth would have prevailed in the criminal trial if had not pled guilty. Indeed, as 






argued by the State in its closing brief, Booth did not present any evidence that he would have 
been acquitted had he taken the case to trial, or that he would have received a lesser-included 
offense such as second degree murder or manslaughter. Harris testified that the evidence did not 
appear to support a claim of second degree murder, much less manslaughter. 
Even if Booth was found guilty of second degree murder, he still bears the heavy burden 
of showing that his sentence would have been less. Second degree murder still has a sentencing 
range of 10 years fixed to life. Booth has failed to set forth any facts or circumstances that 
would support a lesser sentence if he had been found guilty of second degree murder. 
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Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1f%aay of December, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER to be served, by the methodes) as 
indicated, upon: 
Van Bishop 
203 12th Avenue, Ste. B 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 8 
CV06-08651 
06-05307 
[8 U.S. Mail 
o Hand Delivery 
o Federal Express 
o Facsimile 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Idaho State Bar # 4051 
Deputy Attomey General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
) 
Petitioner~Respondent, ) District Court No. CV-06-08651 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 




TO: TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, THE ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONER, VAN 
G. BISHOP, LAW OFFICES OF VAN G. BISHOP, 203 12TH AVENUE RD. SUITE 
B. NAMPA, 1083686 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
000:t1.8 
, JAN. 11. 2010- 2:24PM'- TTNY GEN CR1MD1V NO. 767-P. 3----.. 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 1 st day of December 2009, The 
Honorable Steve Yerby presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1). I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district 
court erred in concluding that counsel in the underlying criminal case had 
rendered ineffective assistance in proceedings resulting in a guilty plea. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been 
sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript: Evidentiary hearing held April 13, 2009. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 28. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
DEBORA KREIDLER 
Court Reporter 
Canyon County District Court 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell. ID 83605 
LAURA WHITING 
Court Reporter 
Canyon County District Court 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell. 1083605 
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(b) That arrangements have been made with the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code § 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a post-conviction relief case (I.A.R. 23{a)(10»; 
(e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 11th day of January 2 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of January 2010, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
THE HONORABLE GREGORY CULET 
Canyon County District Court 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, 10 83605 
TY KETLINSKI 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
VAN G. BISHOP 
Law Offices of Van G. Bishop 
203 12th Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa, ID 83686 
HAND DELIVERY 
MR. STEPHEN W. KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURTS 
P.O. Box 83720 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Idaho State Bar # 4051 
Deputy Attorney General 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
--_A.M·~P.M. 
JAN f 3 2010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, ) 
) District Court No. CV-06-08651 
Petitioner-Respondent, ) 
) AMENDED 
vs. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 





B, NAMPA, ID 83686 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 
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entered in the above-entitled action on the 1 st day of December 2009, The 
Honorable Ste¥e ),lemy GREGORY CULET presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable 
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal~ Whether the district 
court erred in concluding that counsel in the underlying criminal case had 
rendered ineffective assistance in proceedings resulting in a guilty plea. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been 
sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of 
the reporter's transcript Evidentiary hearing held April 13, 2009. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to I.AR. 28. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the 
address set out below: 
DEBORA KREIDLER 
Court Reporter 
Canyon County District Court 




Canyon County District Court 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, 10 83605 
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(b) That arrangements have been made with the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript; 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee 
for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant 
(Idaho Code § 31-3212); 
(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in 
a post-conviction relief case (I.A.R. 23(a)(10»): 
(e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 12th day of January 2 
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J HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of January 2010, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
THE HONORABLE GREGORY CULET 
Canyon County District Court 
1115 Albany st 
Caldwell, I D 83605 
TV KETLINSKI 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, 10 83605 
VAN G. BISHOP 
Law OfJices of Van G. Bishop 
203 12 Avenue Rd. Suite B 
Nampa. ID 83686 
HAND DELIVERY 
MR. STEPHEN W. KENYON 
CLERK OF THE COURTS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
KKJ/pm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CUlET DATE: JANUARY 19, 2010 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 













CASE NO: CV-2006-8651-C 
TIME: 8:30 A.M. 
REPORTED BY: None 
IN CHAMBERS 
--------------------------) 
This having been the time heretofore set for status/scheduling conference in 
the above-entitled matter, the petitioner was not present in court but was represented by 
counsel, Mr. Van Bishop, via telephone; and the respondent was represented by Mr. Ty 
Ketlinski. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding a time frame for filing briefs in this case. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Bishop advised he would file a reply within 
ten (10) days of this date. 
The Court ordered the petitioner to submit their Brief no later than January 
29,2010, and the respondent to submit their Brief no later than February 5, 2010. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 26, 2009 Page 1 
0001.26 
Counsel indicated they understood and court adjourned. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 26,2009 Page 2 
0001.27 
Deputy Clerk 
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Case No. CV -06-08651 *C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent-Appellant. ) 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the 
following exhibit was used at the April 13, 2009 hearing: 
Petitioner's Exhibit: 
1 Memo Admitted Sent 
Also being sent as an exhibit is the following: 
Presentence Investigation Report (From Case #CR-OS-016S8*C) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this day of February, 2010. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and County of Canyon. , 
By: II Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -j 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
-vs-












Case No. CV-06-086S1*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ~""'-=-_ day of February, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in an~ the County of Canyon. 
By: /) Deputy 
'",j 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
-vs-











Supreme Court No. 372~6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Depu~y 
Attorney General, P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Van G. Bishop, 203 12th Ave. Rd., Ste. B, Nampa, Idaho 83686 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ~=-_ day of February, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and County of Canyon. 
By: I) Deputy 
-_J 
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